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FINAL REPORT ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE APARTHEID CONVENTION AND OTHER
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
M. Cherif Bassiouni*
Daniel H. Derby**
Editor's Note.-Pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rightst the Ad Hoc Working Group of
Experts on Southern Africa and the Special Committee Against
Apartheid were "to undertake a study on ways and means of ensuring the implementation of internationalinstruments such as the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, including the establishment of the international jurisdiction envisaged by the said Convention."tt Consequently, ProfessorBassiouni was appointed "Expert Consultant" to
the Group, and, with the assistance of Professor Derby, prepared
the following report, which was unanimously adopted by the Ad
Hoc Working Group of Experts for the Commission on Human
Rights for the purpose of circulating the report among the memberstates for their comments.-it
The report consists of two projects: (1) A Draft Convention
for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court and (2)
A Draft Additional Protocol on the Penal Implementation of the
International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid. The latter, the Secretariat's Note, and
the appendices are not published here; the remainder of the report is printed verbatim.
* Professor of Law, DePaul University; Secretary-General of the International
Association of Penal Law; Dean of the International Institute for Higher Studies in
Criminal Sciences.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Akron.
t G.A. Res. 34/24, ann. 1, 34 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/34/618 (1979).
ft G.A. Res. 34/24, ann. 1, para. 20, 34 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/34/618
(1979).
tt-E/CN.4/AC/22CRP.19/Rev. 1 (10 Dec. 1980, orig. English).
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INhODUCrIoN

1. This is intended to answer the call for a "Study... in 1980 ...
on ways and means of implementing international instruments, such as
the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, including the establishment of the international
jurisdiction envisaged by the Convention." G.A. Res. 34/24, ann. 1, para.
20 (26 November 1979). The report was prepared with implementation
as its central consideration, and begins with an inquiry into the significance of the term "implementation" in view of the nature of the Apartheid
Convention.
2. The report concludes that, in the present context, "implementation" signifies creation of an international criminal court. From this
it proceeds to consider the state of international criminal law in terms
of theory and practicality of operations of such a court, and with special attention to the particular nature of the crime of apartheid.
3. It is upon this foundation of relevant concerns that adoption of
any instrument creating such a court, must be considered.
4. An assessment is included of the possible usefulness of such a
court in combatting the crime of apartheid.
5. Finally, a summary of issues requiring attention and means of
addressing such issues is provided.
6. Throughout, an effort has been made to present a range of options and to describe modalities for achieving the widest possible acceptance of implementation steps. In keeping with this goal of flexibility,
particular approaches are not strongly advocated for outright adoption.
Rather, it is left to the Working Group and other concerned organs to
identify especially promising alternatives based on their competence.
In particular, the possibility of formalizing the quest for consensus in
formulating an appropriate implementation scheme is outlined in the
concluding portion of the report.
7. Although Southern Africa is the chief concern of the Convention
and of the Working Group, the discussion of implementation is general.
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This is not out of a spirit of neutrality. On the contrary, it is out of a
concern that apartheid be recognized and dealt with for what it is,
regardless of where it occurs. Accordingly, general discussion ensures
that implementation measures would be suitable for application in every
context. That the official government policy labeled "apartheid" is not
the sole concern of those combatting the crime of the same name is
readily apparent from such works as the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts prepared in accordance with the Commission
of Human Rights resolution 12 (XXXV) and the Economic and Social
Council decision 1979/34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1365, 31 January 1980.
8. Appendices are attached that may be helpful to understanding
the report, and also to provide perspective, in that apartheid is not alone
among crimes against humanity, and enforcement of international criminal law is a concern shared by persons who approach the matter from
different points of view.
9. Two major reports preceding the present report have been
prepared by distinguished members of the Ad Hoc Working Group.
One by Professor Felix Ermacora entitled "Study Concerning the question of apartheid, from the point of view of international penal law"
E/CN.4/1075, 15 February 1972 and the other by Professor Brarimir
Jankovic entitled Aide-Memoire U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.22/1980WP.2.
10. The two Models contained in this report are:
Draft Convention on the Establishment of an International Penal
Tribunal for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and Other International Crimes (Part C of this report).
This Model is based on the authority of Article V of the International
Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and permits States-Parties to add by Supplemental Agreement
other international crimes which are the subject of multilateral conventions. The Draft Convention contemplates the creation of a new international legal entity, an International Penal Tribunal through a multilateral convention open to States-Parties to the Apartheid Convention
and to other States.
Draft Additional Protocol for the Penal Enforcement of the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid (Part D of this report).
This Model is based on the authority of Article V of the International
Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of Apartheid. It does
not contemplate the potential addition of other international crimes
than those listed in Article II of the Apartheid Convention. This Model
does not contemplate the creation of a new international legal entity
but the use of existing U.N. structures with the addition of one new
structure that of an international panel of judges to adjudicate viola-
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tions of Article II of the Apartheid Convention. It requires an Additional
Protocol to the Apartheid Convention and is open to States-Parties of
the said Apartheid Convention.
11. The idea of the establishment of an international criminal court
is not a novel one as is indicated by the references in footnote 14. Particular care and attention has been given to the reports of Professors
Ermacora and Jankovic referred to above in paragraph 9 and to the
1953 and 1954 International Law Commission's project entitled "A Draft
Statute of an International Criminal Jurisdiction" (see footnote 14) and
the 1979-80 International Law Association's drafts on "A Draft Statute
for an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry" and "A Draft
Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court."
Other studies relevant to this subject have also been considered (see
footnote 14).
12. Parts A and B which follow hereinafter establish the basis for
the two alternative models proposed in Parts C and D for an international penal enforcement system. Parts A and B describe the relationship
between international criminal law and internationally protected human
rights and lay the foundation for the resort to international criminal law
as a means to enforce internationally protected human rights. Furthermore, they establish the legal basis and arguments for an international
penal enforcement mechanism under the Apartheid Convention. In Part
C the proposal is for a multilateral convention with the creation of new
institutions pertaining thereto which would deal not only with the crime
of apartheid but potentially with other international crimes. In Part D
the proposal is for an Additional Protocol to the Apartheid Convention
limiting the jurisdiction of the enforcement organs to the crime of apartheid and maximizing the use of existing institutions and instruments to
implement the Additional Draft Protocol.
A.

Tim MANDATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION: ITS MEANING INTERPRETED
IN VIEW OF TiE NATuRE OF THE Apartheid CONVENTION

1. The conduct proscribed under the Apartheid Convention is also
proscribed under other, international instruments, some of which embody
their own measures and mechanisms of implementation. For this reason, implementation of the Apartheid Convention requires consideration
of its relationship to these other instruments in order to appreciate its
listinctive objectives.
2. This consideration may begin with the duplicativeness of the
Apartheid Convention as to the substantive norm it enunciates in Article II, which describes the violative conduct committed for the purpose
of dominating a racial group, including murder, infliction of harm,
deprivation of personal freedom or dignity, torture, imposition of harmful living conditions, segregation, prevention of development, depriva-
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tion of freedoms, creation of reserves and ghettos, exploitation and
persecution of those who would resist such acts. In this respect the
Apartheid Convention merely describes violative conduct contained in
other norms, but with a narrower scope.
3. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides in Article 2 that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such
and among the rights
as race, colour ...national or social origin ...,"
set forth are: freedom from servitude (Article 4); freedom from discrimination and a guarantee of equal protection of the laws (Article
7); freedom of movement and residence (Article 13); freedom of interracial marriage (Article 16(1)); equal access to public service (Article
21(2)); choice of employment, equal pay and the right to form and
join unions (Article 23); and the right to an opportunity for higher education based on merit (Article 26). Likewise, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights forbids discrimination on the basis
of race, colour or origin (Article 2), and provides rights to: means of
subsistance for peoples (Article 1); freedom of movement and residence
(Article 12); equality before the courts (Article 14); freedom to associate and form or join unions (Article 22(1)); freedom of citizens to vote
and be elected (Article 25); equal protection of the laws (Article 26);
and for minority groups, cultural and developmental opportunities (Article 27). In addition, the International Convention for the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination defines and condemns racial discrimination in
terms that are comprehensive (Article 1), condemns apartheid without
defining it (Article 3), and particularly condemns discrimination regarding listed civil, political, economic and social rights (Article 5).
4. The obvious duplicativeness of the Apartheid Convention as to
its proscription must find explanation in terms of other aspects of the
instrument. Obligations of States-Parties with respect to the norms enunciated may be considered first, and may be divided for that purpose
into obligations of a domestic orientation and those of an international
orientation.
5. The Universal Declaration contains no express provision for
domestic measures to be taken, but both the International Covenant
and the Discrimination Convention do so. The former obligates StatesParties to ensure that all rights under it are protected within their territory (Article 2). The latter imposes general duties to see that its norms are
respected as to discrimination (Article 2) and apartheid (Article 3), and
a more emphatic duty to eliminate discrimination regarding listed rights
(Article 5), plus more specific duties to oppose racist propaganda (Article 4), assure remedies for deprivations of rights under it (Article 6), and
to promote racial tolerance (Article 7). In contrast, the duties under the
Apartheid Convention are highly specific: States-Parties are to declare
apartheid and those engaging in it as criminal (Article I), and to take
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steps to prevent, prosecute, try and punish in accordance with their
jurisdiction crimes of apartheid (Article IV).
6. As to other international instruments, a similar pattern of obligations may be observed, though the Universal Declaration lacks such
specific provisions. The International Covenant requires submission of
reports on compliance (Article 40), and for States-Parties to inform other
States-Parties should they derogate from that instrument's provisions
(Article 4(3)), and to respond to complaints by other States-Parties regarding compliance (Article 41). In addition, the Optional Protocol to
the Covenant provides for responses to certain complaints by individuals
(Article 4(2)). The Discrimination Convention also calls for reports (Article 9(1)), responses to complaints (Article 11(1) and Article 14(6)(b)), plus
informing other States-Parties whether an acceptable solution to a dispute regarding compliance has been found (Article 13(2)). Under the
Apartheid Convention, the obligations are more emphatic. Parties undertake to accept and carry out anti-apartheid decisions of certain international organs (Article VI), but this appears to be redundant in that
such duties are already imposed in more general terms by the instruments relating to those organs. A reporting requirement is imposed
(Article VII(1)), and States-Parties are to settle their disputes regarding
the Convention by means of the International Court of Justice or as
they may otherwise agree (Article XII). Also, in matters of extradition
the States-Parties are not to regard crimes of apartheid as political offenses (Article XI).
7. Related to these internationally-oriented obligations are provisions for implementation machinery, which merit consideration before
assessing the patterns of obligations of the various instruments. No
such machinery is created under the Universal Declaration, but the International Covenant establishes a Human Bights Committee (Article
28), and assigns it the tasks of receiving, studying and transmitting reports of States-Parties (Article 40), considering and reporting on disputes
(Article 41), and, when appropriate, referring such disputes to a conciliation commission (Article 42(1)). The Optional Protocol to the Covenant confers similar competence upon the Human ights Committee
with respect to individuals' complaints (Article 4), and provides for
possible reporting of the views of the Committee (Article 5). Comparable
functions are assigned to a Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination under the Racial Discrimination Convention (Articles 8, 9,
11, 12(1) and 14). Under the Apartheid Convention, however, the function of considering reports is assigned to three members of the Commission of Human Rights designated by its chairman (Article IX), and,
as already mentioned, dispute settlement is otherwise provided for. A
monitoring function is provided for the Commission on Human Rights
(Article X). Finally, it is provided that an accused may be tried by an
international penal tribunal (Article V).
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8. The above pattern of obligations and implementation mechanisms does not present a clear spectrum in terms of effectiveness. Reporting is the chief vehicle for implementation under all of the instruments
having express provisions for duties of States-Parties. Obviously the Optional Protocol, which has relevance not only to the Covenant but also
to the Racial Discrimination Convention, represents an enhancement of
potential effectiveness in that individual complaints are capable of
bringing to light problems unlikely to be dealt with by complaints of
States. Notably, no provision is included in the Apartheid Convention
for individuals' complaints. Dispute resolution is treated differently under the Apartheid Convention than under the other instruments, yet
all of them make it possible for disputes to be settled without compulsory process if the complainant so agrees.
9. Instead of constituting a pattern of increasing or decreasing
effectiveness, the above pattern may be understood as a function of the
perceived purpose of each instrument. The Universal Declaration, as
an embodiment of the widest possible consensus on human rights deserving international attention, contains no express provisions regarding
duties of States or creating implementation machinery. As discussed
elsewhere, it amplifies terms of the Charter, which has its own effectiveness, and certain of its principles are given heightened effectiveness
through more specific instruments, such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant is itself an instrument of
wide consensus and its provisions reflect this by shaping implementation-related measures to deal only with States-Parties, it being apparently contemplated that the Covenant should act as a vehicle for enhancing implementation of the rights provided under it within States
that have already manifested acceptance of the validity of such rights.
No express provision attempts to deal with States that have not manifested such acceptance, and the Optional Protocol is also limited to
States manifesting acceptance. A similar treatment is provided under
the Racial Discrimination Convention, although the duties under it are
more detailed.
10. It is against this background that the distinctiveness of the
Apartheid Convention can be appreciated. Its name is derived from
the term given by South Africa to its racial policies [for reviews of such
policies, see United Nations, Dag Hammarskjhold Library, Apartheid:
A Selective Bibliography on the Racial Policies of the Government of
the Republic of South Africa, 1970-1978 (1979)], and its purpose is to
oppose such policies. Accordingly, although it may be viewed as aiming in part at preventing the spread of such practices to States-Parties,
its primary thrust is against the practices of a non-State-Party. Moreover, to the extent that the term apartheid is given a generic definition
ostensibly applicable to practices of States other than South Africa, it
must be assumed that no State indulging in such practices would also be
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a State-Party to the Apartheid Convention. Accordingly, the distinctive
essence of the Apartheid Convention is that it addresses the consequences
for some states of conduct occurring within another state.
11. This distinctiveness is of central importance to the question
of implementation, for unlike other related instruments the Apartheid
Convention cannot and does not rely on cooperation of the State wherein
the reported human rights violation has occurred. On the contrary, it
concerns itself with cooperation of States within which no such violations have occurred. Such an orientation requires explanation in view
of the general concept of nonintervention by States in the domestic
affairs of other States.
12. Such an explanation may be found in the use by the Apartheid
Convention of the terms "crime against humanity" (Article I), and "international criminal responsibility" (Article III), together with the general obligation to respect human rights which attaches to all members
of the United Nations by virtue of the Charter (Articles LV-LVI). The
precise application of such an obligation, however, is not explicitly
stated, and the specificity with which such rights must be respected is
defined in various instruments. The International Covenant and its
Optional Protocol provide further elaboration of these rights and, for
States-Parties, of the obligations regarding them. To the extent that
such elaboration amounts to a statement of a general principle of international lav (Art. 38, Statute of I.C.J.), it is binding upon non-StatesParties as well, but clearly this is more likely to be true with respect to
a general norm rather than institutional duties such as reporting and
dispute resolution. With respect to racial discrimination, even more detailed elaboration is contained in the Racial Discrimination Convention,
with comparable effect.
13. As a result, the human rights instruments leading up to the
Racial Discrimination Convention may be viewed on the one hand as
progressively elaborating upon general principles of international law
respecting treatment of races, and on the other as providing appropriate means for States-Parties to assure and enhance their compliance
with these principles. The former is not dependent on express consent
of particular States whereas the latter is largely dependent on such
consent.
14. The Apartheid Convention has a similar duality in its nature
but what must be recognized is that two such dualities are involved.
In defining apartheid and indicating that persons ought not to be subjected to a general treatment, there is an elaboration of a general principle comparable in purpose to the definitional portions of related
human rights instruments, but highly specific. In assigning certain obligations to States respecting such conduct, such as reporting and dispute
resolution requirements, there is an elaboration of a consent-dependent
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regime not greatly different from those of other, related human rights
instruments.
15. However, there is a significant departure from prior instruments
of similar vein in the pronouncements of criminality and the provisions
dealing with consequences of this criminalization. With the exception
of genocide and excluding the laws of war, no violations enunciated in
other human rights instruments have been described as criminal. Even
racial discrimination is not described within the Racial Discrimination
Convention as amounting to a crime. This terminology is applied exclusively to apartheid. Accordingly, the specific conduct described in the
Apartheid Convention's proscription is not merely a more detailed treatment of a human rights violation but also a seminal description of a
new international crime. As to its impact on non-States-Parties, consonance of the conventional language with general principles of international law is crucial, for to the extent such consonance exists, the concept
would be applicable to non-States-Parties, otherwise it would not be.
16. Moreover, the same is true with respect to the duties of States
to criminalize, prosecute and punish such conduct. This is in stark contrast to the consequences of reporting and dispute-resolution measures.
The difference lies in the fact that particular consequences attach to
international crimes under general principles of international law and
customary international law, concerning duties of States in preventing
and punishing international crimes.
17. Thus, just as the mere describing of certain conduct as violating international law does not make it so, as a general principle of
international law, so also describing certain conduct as criminal under
international law does not ipso facto make it an international crime.
Likewise, stating that certain action ought to be taken by States with
respect to certain conduct does not ipso facto establish a general rule
of international law, but if the conduct in question is actually an international crime, then certain obligations of States flow from that.
18. In sum, if the various human rights instruments touching upon
racial matters are viewed simply as consensual arrangements among
States-Parties, the Apartheid Convention appears duplicative though
some of its provisions are not themselves repetitious. However, when
these instruments are considered as declarations regarding general rules
of international law, the distinctive role of the Apartheid Convention
becomes clearer. It strives to define the international crime of apartheid
and to express the consequences for States of that crime, while at the
same time extending particular attention and protective measures to
that matter in a manner similar to that done under other human rights
instruments.
19. As a human rights instrument, the Apartheid Convention is as
well implemented and as well founded and drafted as kindred human
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rights instruments. It is as a declaration of international criminal law
that the Apartheid Convention merits special attention.
20. The particular legal questions relating to mode of implementation are addressed and assessed below. It is useful, however, to first
consider certain general matters.
21. First, it must be noted that the Apartheid Convention does
not by its terms attempt to class apartheid as a mere crime of extraterritorial effect, suitable for independent action by individual States
or concerted action by groups of States. Rather, it treats apartheid as
a "crime against humanity," and one entailing "international criminal
responsibility." Accordingly, although various states may feel the harmful effects of the crime, it is to be punished in the name of or on behalf
of the world community. This suggests in itself that a uniform standard
should be applied.
22. Second, although the Apartheid Convention is designed to be
declaratory as to the acts constituting the international crime of apartheid, it may in that respect be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive
or both, in that the actual crime's existence and character are dependent
in part on the convention and in part on other conventions. As a result,
the definition given in Article II of the Apartheid Convention may be
viewed as conventionally binding upon States-Parties, but as to States
that are not Parties its binding quality depends on its correspondence
to other conventions or on a general rule of international law. Accordingly, enforcement by States-Parties under the Apartheid Convention,
in keeping with the terms of that convention, may also be justifiable
under other conventions and under other general principles of international law. This is not to say that actions under the convention would
not be otherwise justifiable.
23. Third, the search for appropriate means of implementation for
this aspect of the Apartheid Convention is, if not easy, narrowly drawn.
By its very nature implementation of criminal law is by criminal processes, and although significant variations in such processes exist in
different legal systems, the general nature of such processes is similar.
24. The distinctive character of criminal processes may be appreciated not only by their particular form but also by their distinctive purposes. Criminal law does not merely specify proper or improper forms
of behavior, a function of other law generally. Rather, it identifies behavior in response to which particular measures are to be imposed not
in the name of or on behalf of someone disadvantaged by that conduct,
but rather in the name of and on behalf of the community and its need
for protection. Such measures are commonly termed "penal" or "punitive"
in order to indicate that they are not designed merely to remedy past
harm of a remediable type. On the contrary, they are directed at the
future in the sense of generally deterring future conduct of that kind,
by incapacitating the offender or by affecting the offender's will or
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inclination to engage in such conduct. Only in the sense of retribution
do such measures have a remedial aspect, and this is aimed at vindicating the victim's and the community's sense of justice. [See, e.g., M.C.
BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CIUMINAL LAW 73-103 (1978).]
25. Because of the purpose of criminal processes, initiation and
conduct of such processes must be entrusted to institutions and persons
qualified to act on behalf of the relevant community. The appropriate
motivation for initiation and direction of such process is concern for
justice.
26. A second consequence of the purposes of criminal process is
that an orderly and reliable method for establishing facts must be utilized. The broad outlines of such methods include both general investigation and consideration of allegations against and for the accusedthus the importance of gathering evidence with particular care in utilizing the most reliable sources. It should be noted that, although instruments with an affirmative, human rights protection function, have
involved some investigative activity, the procedures followed have not
been as orderly and reliable as would be required for punitive purposes.
[See, e.g., Franck and Fairley, "Procedural Due Process in Human Rights
Fact-finding by International Agencies," 74 A.J.I.L. 308 (1980).]
27. A third consequence is that criminal norms and penalties must
be specified in detail. This is because of the need to preserve fairness
and justice. The principles of legality embodied in the maxims nullum
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege are universally recognized, but
not entirely fulfilled in the Apartheid Convention. Conduct cannot be
fairly punished when the community has not clearly expressed its intention that such conduct be avoided.
28. The foregoing demonstrates that a mandate to implement the
Apartheid Convention constitutes a mandate to create more than the
mechanisms necessary to set in motion a new criminal process. Indeed,
bringing international criminal law to bear on this wrongful conduct
has been an enduring consideration of those involved in anti-apartheid
activities. [See, e.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts,
"Study concerning the question of apartheid from the point of view of
the international penal law," U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1075, 15 February 1972.]
The central institution in such a process is a court, but related institutions may also be appropriate in order to assist the functioning of the
court. The tasks that require treatment in order for such a court to operate merit separate attention.
29. The ultimate implementation goal of the Apartheid Convention
may obviously be served by such an approach in that the goals of
criminal process are prevention and suppression of specific conduct.
The extent to which criminal process on an international scale can secure in practice such goals also mzerits separate consideration.
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30. Once such an institutional framework is established it can be
used for other international crimes.
B.

INTERNATIONAL CRmInNAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS

I. The Application of International Criminal Law Principles
to Internationally Protected Human Rights
1. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3086, 28 GAOR (No. 50), U.N. Doc. A/9
233/Add.1. 30 November 1973, (hereinafter referred to as Apartheid
Convention), is an harmonious part of the global scheme of international
protection of human rights. As such it must be considered in light of
other relevant Conventions and interpreted in pari materia therewith.
To the extent that these other relevant Conventions are specifically
embodied in the language and spirit of the Apartheid Convention and
in particular Article II thereof, they are to that extent incorporated
therein.
2. These relevant conventions fall into two categories: 1) Conventions which are declaratory of certain specific human rights deemed
protected by the international law of human rights; and 2) Conventions
which require signatories to criminalize certain violations of human
rights in their national laws, to prosecute the violators or alternatively
to extradite persons accused or found guilty thereof to a requesting
state. Some of these Conventions specifically declare the conduct in
question to be a "crime under international law" while others do not
state it specifically; the object and outcome remain, however, the same.
3. The Conventions included in the first category, which contain
declaratory principles on the protection of specific human rights, do
not, however, deem their violations to be crimes under international
law nor do they contemplate criminalization of the conduct in question
under the national laws of the signatory states. However, they are nonetheless relevant in the historical process in that, as the embodiment
of a worldwide consensus of certain minimum standards, these prescriptions may evolve into proscriptions which may become the object of
enforcement measures including their criminalization under international
law, or the imposition under international law of a duty to prosecute
or extradite the violators of these protected rights. This has been the
case with respect to many international instruments aimed at the protection of human rights which evolved from declaratory principles to
specific international proscriptions having a penal character (see Appendix 1).
4. The principal Conventions in this category which, because they
refer to a prohibition or protection against "racial discrimination" are
relevant to the interpretation and implementation of the Apartheid
Convention, are:'
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination

The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
The Convention on Refugees (and The Protocol to the Convention)

Each of these Conventions specifically refers to the protection of
individuals against racial discrimination and is relevant in whole or in
part to the Apartheid Convention, and more particularly to the meaning of Article II, of the said Convention and the other provisions which
implement it. (In addition other Conventions of the United Nations
and its Specialized Agencies such as the ILO and UNESCO, which
also include provisions against "racial discrimination" and its consequent
practices, could be deemed included in this category.)
5. The significance of these Conventions lies first in that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could be deemed under the International Court of Justice in its 1970 "Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia" 2 as incorporated in the meaning of Article 55 of the U.N.
Charter.3 Thus if the Universal Declarationof Human Rights is deemed
to be the further expression of the words "Human Rights" of Article
55, and Article 56 of the Charter states that the protection of "human
rights" under Article 55 is "self-executing," consequently the protections
afforded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are applicable
to the U.N. member-States and binding upon them.
6. To the extent that the conventions deemed relevant and listed
in Paragraph 4 above interpret the specific rights enunciated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights they may, by incorporation, be
considered binding on all U.N. member-States and not only on their
signatory States. Such a binding effect would not derive from each
convention qua, but from the fact that it gives specific meaning to
specific rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which under the interpretation given in Paragraph 5 incorporates the
said Universal Declaration in the meaning of Article 55 of the U.N.
Charter and that Article 56 thereof requires the member-States to enforce the protection of these human rights.
7. Insofar as the Apartheid Convention prohibits conduct predicated on "racial discrimination" which is specifically stated and defined
in the Declaration and Conventions listed in Paragraph 4, it can be
said that the Apartheid Convention incorporates in its meaning of the
prohibited conduct stated in Article II thereof the provisions of these
other Conventions to the extent they are applicable.
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8. Mutatis mutandi, to the extent that the Apartheid Convention
criminalizes certain extreme forms of "racial discrimination" as defined
and prohibited by the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, and that these two conventions give meaning to
the protection against "racial discrimination" which is guaranteed by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, which Declaration is
applicable to U.N. member-States through Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter and discussed in Paragraphs 5 and 6, it could be argued that
by incorporation of the relevant provisions of these Conventions in the
Declaration that U.N. member-States are obligated under the Charter
not to engage in the practices of "Apartheid" as defined in Article II
of the Apartheid Convention. In any event, the obligation exists under
general principles of international law.
9. The second category of relevant Conventions, namely those
which either declare given conduct as "a crime under international law,"
or which declare that the conduct in question should be criminalized
under the national criminal laws of the signatory-States and thus embody the maxim aut dedere aut judicare are:
4
i. The Nuremberg Principles
ii. Crimes Against Humanity 5
iii. The Genocide Convention 6
of August 12, 1949 and the 1977
iv. The four Geneva Conventions
7

Additional Protocols thereto
8
v. The Slavery Conventions
vi. The Convention of the Nonapplicability of Statutes of Limitation
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity9
vii. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 10

In addition one Convention should be prospectively added:
viii. The Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of
Torture"
10. The relevance of these Conventions is first that Article I of
the Apartheid Convention declares the conduct defined in Article II
thereof as "a crime against humanity" and thus incorporates by reference Crimes Against Humanity which derive their meaning from the
Nuremberg Principles. In addition the conduct prohibited by Article II
of the Apartheid Convention includes inter alia conduct deemed a
"crime under international law," and conduct regarding which an international duty to prosecute or extradite exists under the provisions of
the Conventions listed in Paragraph 9. Thus Article II incorporated to
the extent applicable some of the provisions stated in these conventions
and is to be interpreted in light of the meaning of these other Conventions which prohibit the same conduct. The difference between the
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prohibition of Article II and the prohibition stated in these other Conventions is that the Apartheid Convention prohibition refers to specific
conduct done in furtherance of a policy of "racial discrimination" while
the other Conventions with the exception of the Genocide Convention
do not limit their prohibitions and violations to that particular purpose.
11. Article II of the Apartheid Convention includes a number of
specific prohibitions and violations thereof deemed criminal under "international law" which, as discussed above, incorporate the meaning of
other specific protections and prohibitions contained in some relevant
Conventions listed in Paragraph 4, whose binding effect on U.N. memberStates is discussed in Paragraphs 5, 6, and 8, and on the signatories of
the Conventions listed in Paragraph 9.
12. Insofar as Article IV of the Apartheid Convention requires
States-Parties to "prosecute" and "punish" the violators of Article II of
the said Convention, and, Article V contemplates the enforcement of
these violations by means of an "international penal tribunal," and,
Article IX requires States-Parties to "extradite" perpetrators of such
violations, it is therefore necessary in order to satisfy the principle of
legality in criminal law, nullum. crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege
which is a "general principle of international law recognized by civilized
nations," a source of international law under Article 38 of the Statute
of the InternationalCourt of Justice, that Article II be given more specificity in order to avoid vagueness, ambiguity and incorporation by
reference or analogy of other relevant treaty provisions deemed incorporated within the meaning of Article II of the Apartheid Convention.
II. Institutional Setting: Progress Toward Creation of an
International Criminal Court
1. Article V of the Apartheid Convention contemplates the creation of an "international penal tribunal" to enforce the violations of
Article II of the said Convention. Thus the legislative authority for the
creation of an International Criminal Court is clearly established.
12
2. The only precedents save for an isolated historical instance
are the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes Tribunal which were ad hoc
international criminal courts. 13 There are no other examples of such
Tribunals in contemporary history.
3. In 1951 the United Nations by Resolution 7 GAOR Supp. II,
U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1953) presented a Draft Statute of an International
Criminal Jurisdiction prepared by a committee of experts and in 1953
in 9 GAOR Supp. 12 U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954) a second draft was presented to the General Assembly based on the works of another commitand no further action was taken
tee of experts. Both Drafts were tabled
14
by the U.N. on these two projects.
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4. The principal reasons for this action could be summarized as
follows:
i. There existed no codification of international crimes; in particular "Aggression"'15 bad not been defined and those other cus-

tomary and conventional crimes were insufficiently defined with
few exceptions;

ii. The proposed international criminal jurisdiction contemplated
the exercise of its jurisdiction over all international crimes, in-

cluding those as of then deemed insufficiently defined;
iii.
A "General Pare, dealing with principles of responsibility and
other matters usually included in a "General Part" of the criminal codes or laws of most legal systems bad not been elaborated
and what was proposed by the two U.N. Committees of Experts
who prepared the 1951 and 1953 Drafts did not obtain sufficient consensus;
iv. The absence of an international criminal code containing both
a "General Part" and a "Special Part" (the crimes) violated the

generally accepted principle nullum crimen sine lege, nulla
poena sine lege; and
v. The two Drafts required an amendment to the U.N. Charter,
which was impractical.
5. In 1972 a Special Report was prepared by the Ad Hoc Working
Group of Experts of the Commission (Commission on Human Rights)
Resolution 8 (XXVII), entitled "Study Concerning the Question of
Apartheid from the Point of View of International Penal Law" E. CN.
4/1075, 15 February 1972, which sets forth the basis for the creation
of an international criminal jurisdiction under the authority of Article
V of the Apartheid Convention. No action was taken on that Report and
no further implementation of Article V of the Apartheid Convention
has been proposed until recently.
III. Apartheid as an International .Crime: Special
Issues on Responsibility
1. Based on Article III of the Apartheid Convention and in accordance with resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights and the
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Southern Africa, the basic principle of
responsibility adopted is that of direct individual responsibility. However, this basis of responsibility is much too narrow under Article III
and under international criminal law.16
2. Insofar as the Apartheid Convention declares that the conduct
proscribed in Article II constitutes a "crime under international law"
the principle of responsibility thereunder should conform to established
17
norms which are:
i. Direct responsibility for individual conduct;
ii. Command responsibility for acts of subordinates;
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Individual responsibility for failure to act;
Responsibility of corporate entities;
State responsibility;
The nonapplicability of the defense of superior orders (if a
moral choice existed). 18

3. While International Criminal Law contemplates only the punishment of individuals, the responsibility of corporate entities and that
of the State can be deemed to be a quasi-criminal responsibility for
which fines and punitive damages are the appropriate remedies.
4. The principle of State responsibility for wrongful conduct should
also apply, 19 and the appropriate remedies would be remedial legislative and administrative action, reparations and damages.
IV. Some Considerations on the Potential Impact of
Creating an International Penal System to Prevent
and Punish the Crime of Apartheid
The prevention of apartheid can be accomplished through the processes of international criminal law only to the extent that the threat of
punishment deters such conduct, the corollary of which is that actual
imposition of punishment can be accomplished in order to achieve specific deterrence through retribution, incapacitation, and finally rehabilitation. Accordingly, effectiveness of any penal measures depends on the
machinery implementing the system and its prompt and certain operation.
In that respect an international penal system is no different from a na20
tional penal system.
A. Individuals in States with apartheid as policy
Present threat of punishment
1. It may be assumed that no State with apartheid as an official
policy would adhere to a Draft Convention and Protocol as proposed
herein (Parts C and D), and therefore no such State would be bound
by its express terms. As a result, the existence of such an Instrument
would in itself have no effect on the amenability of persons within such
a State to an international criminal process. Such States would refuse
to comply with requests and orders of an international enforcement system and such refusal would leave matters as they were before the
instrument came into existence. However, any individual who had committed crimes of apartheid would find it necessary as a matter of prudence to refrain from going into the territory of any State who is a party
to the Draft Convention (Part C) and the Protocol (Part D). The same
deterrence applies to other States with which States-Parties to the Draft
Convention and Protocol have extradition relations and could secure
the surrender to them of such a person. 21
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2. Accordingly, the chief impact of the Draft Convention and Protocol would be to limit offenders' freedom of travel, which is a small but
perceptible punishment. The greater the number of States-Parties to the
Draft Convention and Protocol, and the stronger the expectation that
that individual's acts were known to the machinery under the Draft
Convention and Protocol, the greater the impact of the restrictions and
limitations.
3. Individuals may also be tried in absentia, as is theoretically possible under the Draft Convention and Protocol and that would have the
same if not a greater deterrent effect on the mobility of such persons
beyond their State's boundaries. Another consideration which has negative implications on the preservation of world order is the possibility
that such persons found guilty may be targeted for violence or death by
liberation movements or terrorist organizations or even by individuals.
Such a result might serve as a deterrent, but no legal system would
tolerate much less advocate enforcement of its judgments by lawless
action, all authorities concurring that such conduct undermines the integrity of the legal system as an instrument of justice and the stability
of world order.
4. Expectation of investigation and prosecution and actual commencement of an investigation for prosecution is also a deterrent, but
it could also be relied upon by lawless persons or organizations as pretexts for violence.
5. Stigmatization resulting from investigation, prosecution or conviction would also be an effective remedy, particularly where worldwide
publicity attaches to the fact. But such factors are contrary to all theories
of rehabilitation and resocialization.
Future threat of punishment
6. The greatest threat to individuals residing in States with apartheid as policy would be in the future. Policies of States are subject to
change, and in the case of apartheid the policy is most kindly described
as a doomed anachronism. However, offenders may view their efforts
as postponing the inevitable so that they may reap the benefits of the
exploitation aspects of apartheid as long as possible before fleeing the
State. The absence of a jurisdictional basis for other States to prosecute
them may leave such offenders with the impression that they cannot
be punished outside of their State, and it should be noted that the
Apartheid Convention itself merely requires States-Parties to punish
offenders according to their own rules of jurisdiction. Thus, the absence of any mechanism for exercise of international jurisdiction is a
serious problem.
7. Extradition limits the possibility of evading punishment, but
offenders may be optimistic about finding themselves in a State that
will not hold them for extradition. Unfortunately that optimism may
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not be without basis. Many States would regard apartheid as a political
offense and would refuse to extradite an offender to the State wherein
the crimes were committed if the government were changed. Moreover,
even States-Parties to the Apartheid Convention, which are obligated
not to regard apartheid as a political offense, might lack a legal basis
to hold such an offender until a treaty of extradition was arranged
with that offender's former State, so that during the period of government change many offenders would be able to pass through even such
States.
8. Under the Draft Convention and Protocol, however, the list of
places for even the most temporary asylum would shrink in relationship
to the number of States-Parties to that Statute and the multiplier effect
of their extradition relations with other non-States-Parties. Thus, the
choice of an ultimate place of asylum might be severely limited.
9. States who may be reluctant to enforce the provisions of the
Apartheid Convention in their national system, may find it more politically convenient and acceptable to do so by recognizing an international penal jurisdiction.
B.

Individuals in Other States
1. In States not having an official policy of apartheid but which
may be occasionally instituted may consider acts of apartheid either as
individual perpetrators, illegal government activities, or as possible future government policy. If that State is a party to the Draft Convention
and Protocol, complaints to the Procuracy could result in their conduct's
being brought to the attention of appropriate government officials or
other officials, and that would be an effective deterrent to such activities.
With respect to non-States-Parties, the Draft Convention and Protocol permits the investigation, prosecution, adjudication and punishment
of such acts irrespective of where they are committed. Thus a certain
deterrent effect can be expected.
2. The independence and impartiality of the Draft Convention and
Protocol machinery and particularly the Court are an inducement to
States whether parties or non-parties to assist in the effective functioning of these organs, particularly where states can foresee, as in the
case of the Draft Convention, the possible expansion of the jurisdictions
of its organs to other international crimes, which is a prospect frequently
hoped for by a number of responsible personalities in many states.
C. Threat of punishment to States
1. Historically, penalties for a State's wrongful conduct can be
imposed only by virtue of military domination or the coerced consent
of the affected State. However, the United Nations has augured a new
era and such sanctions are now within the exclusive provinc6 of the
Security Council.
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2. At issue here is not the resort to the Security Council for sanctions whether economic or military because that is defined by the law
of the United Nations Charter. What is at issue is the concept of fines
or reparations as a measure of punitive damages against States who
engage in internationally established wrongful conduct. 22
3. The economic impact of such fines could have an impact on
the international trade of such a State and be the most effective deterrent against what is basically a crime of State-Policy, even though it
is carried out by individuals.
4. Finally, the effect of condemnation in world public opinion,
and the potential diplomatic isolation of such a State would also have
serious deterrent implications.
D. Transnational corporations
1. Surprisingly, perhaps, one of the most promising areas for deterring apartheid may be in connection with transnational corporations
(TNCs). Because TNCs may have property in the territory of StatesParties to the Draft Convention and Protocol, the threat of fines to be
levied against such property may be a very real and effective deterrent.
In the face of such a threat, TNCs could be forced to choose between
dealing with States with a policy of apartheid and States-Parties to the
Draft Convention and Protocol.
2. One major qualification must be stated, however. Further elaboration is required before any process against TNCs could be attempted
to distinguish between corporate policy that in fact aids apartheid and
employees who may or may not be part of that decision-making process,
and corporate policy that in fact defeats apartheid.
E. Other Considerations
1. The creation of an international penal system as proposed in
the Draft Convention and Protocol, while largely dependent for their
effectiveness on the cooperation and support of States-Parties, will nonetheless create a momentum of its own. World public opinion would
be affected by the very establishment of any of these two alternative
systems, and it would certainly be shaped by its activities. Ultimately
it is not international instruments or institutions which significantly
alter state or individual conduct, though they contribute to it, but it
is the change in individual and social values which produces the desired result. One has only to consider that slavery has been almost
eradicated not by the force of international enforcement machinery but
by the cumulative impact of measures including international instruments which brought the change in social values that was the direct
cause for its quasi-eradication.2 3
2. It should also be noted that States-Parties to the Apartheid
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Convention are bound to use their national legal system to investigate,
prosecute and punish the crime of apartheid irrespective of whether
there is an international penal enforcement machinery. That duty would
24
still continue to exist even if an international penal system is established.

1. For citations to these and other international instruments on the protection
of human rights referred to herein, see, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments U.N. Pub. E. 78 XIV. 2 (1978). See also United Nations Action
in the Field of Human Rights (1974) U.N. Pub. E. 74 XIV. 2; and e.g., L. Sohn
and T. Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights (1973). See also J.
Graven, Problemes de Protection Internationale des Droits de L'Homme (1969) (Institut International des Droits de l'Homme). See also Appendix 2 for a listing of
International Instruments.
2. (1971) I.C.I. Rep. 16.
3. Id. Paras. 129-130-131 of the opinion p. 57 et seq., and Schwelb, "The
International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter," 66
AJ.I.L. 337 (1972).
4. For the Nuremberg Principles see Res. 95 (I), 11 December 1946; "The
United Nations Declaration on the Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment" Report of the International Law Commission, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 12, U.N.
Doc. A/1316, 11-14 (1950) (which was not voted upon by the General Assembly).
See also M. C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda, A Treatise on International Criminal Law
Vol. I (1973) p. 587. See also Proceedings in the Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols. (1949), known as the "Blue
Series." The ensuing trials were published under the title Trials of War Criminals
before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 14 vols. (1949), known as the "Green
Series." For an interesting account of the trial and the accused, see E. Davidson,
The Trial of the Germans (1966). For a legal appraisal and description of the proceedings, see R. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (1960); J.
Keenan and B. Brown, Crimes against International Law (1950); S. Glueck, War
Criminals, Their Prosecution and Punishment (1944); see also, P. Poltorak, The Nuremberg Epilogue (1977), translated from the Russian by D. Skvirsky.
5. For "Crimes Against Humanity" see the "Nuremberg Principles" supra
note 4, Principle VI (C). For a historical-legal analysis of "Crimes Against Humanity"
see Bassiouni, "International Law and the Holocaust" 9 Calif. West. Int'l L.J. 201
(1979).
6. Supra notes I and 5; and see also, E. Aronneau Le Crime Contre l'Humanit6 (1961) and P. Drost, The Crime of State (2 vols.) (1959).
7. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949:
For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces of the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, 19 June 1977,
ICRC, (August-September, 1977).
8. See supra note 1, but also other conventions on the subject listed in M. C.
Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code (1980),
at "A list of the Principal International Instruments" p. xiii, under "Slavery and
Slave-Related Practices" that lists 25 international instruments. Appendix 2; see also
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B. DeSchutter, A Bibliography on International Criminal Law (1972) and Bibliography on International Criminal Law and International Criminal Courts, U.N. Secretariat U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/28 (1950).
9. Supra note 1; see also 37 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal Vol. 3-4
devoted to that subject.
10. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages U.N. GAOR
(XXXIV), A/34/811. 13 December 1979. See also e.g., M. C. Bassiouni, International Terrorism and Political Crimes (1975).
11. See the U.N. "Declaration on the protection of all persons from being
subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" Res. 3453 (XXX), 9 December 1975. The "Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Torture" introduced by the Association Internationale de
Droit Penal before the Sub-Commission on The Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4 NGO/213, 1 February 1978, and 48
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal No. 3-4 (1977) devoted to that subject. The
Draft Articles before the Commission's Working Group are the official Swedish
Draft E/CN.4/1285 (which is quite similar to the AIDP Draft) and Comments
thereon are in E/CN.4/1314.
12. Prof. A. Schwartzenberger reported that in 1474 one Peter Von Hagenbush was prosecuted by an international tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire for
war crimes in Breisach, Germany, "The Breisach War Crime Trial of 1474" The
Manchester Guardian Sept. 27, 1946, see also de Barrante, Histoire des Ducs de
Bourgogne Vol. IX (1837). Another precedent could also be that of the trial in Naples
of Couradin Von Hohenstofen for initiating an "unjust war" in 1268, though the
composition of the tribunal was not international, see Bierzaneck, "The Prosecution
of War Crimes" in Bassiouni and Nanda, supra note 4, p. 559, 560. Another possible precedent is the decision of the "Allies" at the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle
of 1810 to detain Napoleon Bonaparte on the Island of Elba for waging unjust wars.
See Bellot, "The Detention of Napoleon Bonaparte" 39 Temple L. Rev. 170 (1923).
13. See Wright, History of the U.N. War Crimes Commission (1948); Proceedings in the Trial of the Major War Criminals Before International Military Tribunals
(1942) 42 Vols.; R. Woetzel, The Nuremberg Epilogue (1971); Roling, "The Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials," in Bassiouni and Nanda, supra note 4, p. 590.
14. G.A. Res. 1187 (XII) 11 November 1957. See Report of the SecretaryGeneral on "International Criminal Jurisdiction," U.N. GAOR (XII) 1957, Doe.
A13649; see also U.N. Historical Survey on the Question of the International Criminal Jurisdiction Doe. A/CN.4/7, Rev. 1 (1949). For a documentary history of the
various projects for the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, see B.
Ferencz, The International Criminal Court (1980) 2 Vols. See also, J. Stone and R.
Woetzel, Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court (1970); 35 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal No. 1-2 (1964) devoted to that subject, and 45 Revue
Internationale de Droit Penal No. 3-4 (1974) containing the contributions of the
AIDP to V U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Geneva, September 1975 devoted to the subject of "La Creation d'une Justice Penale Internationale." The Revue Internationale de Droit Penal contained scholarly writings on
this subject in its issues of 1928, 1935, 1945 and 1952 as well as others. The AIDP
has traditionally supported the creation of an international criminal court as witnessed by the positions it has taken at its various International Congresses, and
those of its distinguished members among them; Pella, Donnedieu de Vabres, Saldana,
Graven, Jimenez de Asua, Sotille, Cornil, Bouzat, Jescheck, Romoshkiin, Herzog,
Glaser, Dautricourt, Quaintano-Rippoles, Arroneau, Mueller, De Schutter, Triffterer,
Lombois, Plawski, Ferencz, Oehler, Zubkowski. As Secretary-General of the AIDP
this writer has consistently supported the proposition. Because of the numerous
writings on the subject by the above mentioned scholars and others it would be
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impossible to cite them all, but see Bassiouni supra note 8 "Bibliography" p. 175.
For three more recent initiatives resulting in the submission of a draft statute, see
the International Law Association, "Draft Statute for an International Commission
of Criminal Injury" adopted by its International Criminal Law Committee in Paris
May 1979. Proceedings of the International Law Association (Belgrade Conference
1980) p. 4; and "Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court," World Peace
through Law, Abidjan World Conference August 1973 (edited by Robert K. Woetzel);
and a "Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court" prepared by the Foundation for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, see also, K. de Haan "The
Procedural Problems of a Permanent International Criminal Jurisdiction" in De bestraffing van inbreuken tegen het oorlogs-en het humanitair recht (A. Beirlaen, S.
Dockx, K. de Haan, C. Van den Wijngaert, eds., 1980) p. 191.
15. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974. See also B. Ferencz, Defining
International Aggression (1975) 2 Vols.
16. See Bassiouni supra note 8 at pp. 10-19.
17. "For direct responsibility of individual conduct," "Command responsibility
for acts of subordinates," "Individual responsibility for failure to act" and "Individual responsibility for participating in criminal organizations," see the "Nuremberg
Principles" supra note 4. For some general works see Komarov, "Individual Responsibility Under International Law: The Nuremberg Principles in Domestic Legal
Systems," 29 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 21 (1980); Diritto Penale Internazionale (Consiglio
Superiore della Magistratura, 1979); C. Lombois, Droit Penal International (1st ed.
1971, 2d ed. 1979); Green, "An International Criminal Code-Now?" 3 Dalhousie
L.J. 560, 561 (1976); Dinstein, "International Criminal Law," 5 Israel Y.B. of Human
Rights 55, 72 (1975); La Belgique et le Droit International Penal, B. DeSehutter ed.
(1975); D. Oehler, Internationales Strafrecht (1974); Special issue 45 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 3-4 (1974) on International Criminal Law; Triffterer in
Bassiouni and Nanda, A Treatise on International Criminal Law vol. II (1974) pp.
86-96; M. C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda, A Treatise on International Criminal Law
(1973) two volumes; Munch, in Bassiouni and Nanda, A Treatise on International
Criminal Law vol. I (1973) pp. 143-55; B. DeSehutter, A Bibliography on International Criminal Law (1972); S.Plawski, Etude des PrincipesFondamentaux du Droit
InternationalPenal (1972); S.Glaser, Droit Penal International Conventionnel (1970);
0. Triffterer, Dogimatische Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des Materiellen V6Ikerstrafrechts seit Niirnberg (1966); G. 0. W. Mueller and E. M. Wise, International
Criminal Law (1965); V. Pella, La Guerre-Crime et les Criminels de Cuerre (1964);
S. Glaser, Infraction Internationale(1957); A. Quintano-Rippoles, Tratado de Derecho
Penal Internacional y Internacional Penal (1956) two volumes; H.-H. Jescheck, Die
Vorantlichkeit der Staatsorgane Nach Vdlkerstrafrecht (1952); V. Pella, La Codification du Droit Penal International (1952); N. Levi, 11 Diritto Penale Internazionale
(1949); Radin, "International Crimes," 32 Iowa L. Rev. 33, 46 (1946); H. Donnedieu
de Vabres, Introduction a l'Etude du Droit Penal International (1928); M. Travers,
Le Droit Penal Internationale et sa Mise en Oeuvre en Temps de Paix et en Temps
de Guerre (1920-22) five volumes; Meili, Lehrbuch des Internationalen Strafrechts
und Strafprocessrechts(1910); Hegler, Prinzipindes InternationaledStrafrechts (1906).
18. See the "Nuremberg Principles" supra note 4, Y. Dinstein, The Defense
of Obedience to Superior Orders in International Law (1965) and Vogler, "The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders in International Criminal Law" in Bassiouni
and Nanda, supra note 4.
19. See Report of the International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. II Part 2 (1978) p. 74 wrongful act of the State,
Source of International Responsibility A/CN.4!246, 5 March 1971. See the International Law Commission's report "The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State,
Source of International Responsibility," U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246, 5 March 1971,
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citing landmark decisions of the P.C.I.J. and I.C.J. as well as arbitral decisions. See
also M. Whiteman, A Digest of International Law, Vols. 1 and 8 (1968); A. Verdross,
V6lkerrecht (5th ed. 1964); C. Balladore-Pallieri, Diritto Internazionale Publico (8th
ed. 1962); C. Rousseau, Principes Generaux de Droit International Public (1953);
P. Guggenheim, Traite de Droit International Public (1953); H. Kelsen, Principles
of International Law (1952); L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1 (Lauterpacht
8th ed. 1955); G. Schwarzenberg, International Law (3rd ed. 1957); J. Personnaz,
La Reparation du Prejudice en Droit InternationalPublic (1939); C. Eagleton, The
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C.

DRAFT

CON'VENnON ON THE ESTABLISHMIENT

OF AN INTERNATIONAL

PENAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE SUPPRESSION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF Apartheid AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

First Part: Nature of the Tribunal and its Organs and Powers
Article I-Purposes
An International Penal Tribunal is hereby established for the specific purpose of enforcing the penal provisions of the International Con-

vention for the Prevention and Suppression of the crime of Apartheid,
and any other international crime as the States-Parties may wish to in-

clude within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by Supplemental Agreement.
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Article Il-Nature of the Tribunal
The Tribunal shall be a permanent body, occupying facilities and
performing its chief functions at the Palace of Justice in the Hague,
and utilizing as its official languages those of the United Nations.
Article Ill-Organs of the Tribunal
1. The Tribunal shall consist of the following organs:
a. The Court;
b. The Procuracy;
c. The Secretariat; and
d. The Standing Committee of States-Parties to the Statute of
the International Penal Tribunal.
2. The functions and competence of the above organs shall be as
described in the Third Part of this Convention.
Article IV-jurisdiction
1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over "grave breaches" of
Article II of the International Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid to wit: murder; torture;
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary
arrest and detention; and,
2. Any other act or conduct deemed an international crime by
virtue of a multilateral convention in force which declares that act
or conduct to be an international crime or which requires its contracting parties to criminalize it under their national laws and to
prosecute or extradite its perpetrators, provided that any party
hereto who wishes the Tribunal to exercise such jurisdiction does
so by virtue of a Supplemental Agreement to this Convention.
3. The Tribunal shall have universal jurisdiction with respect to
the investigation, prosecution, adjudication and punishment of persons and legal entities accused or found guilty of those crimes
which are within its jurisdiction.
Article V-Competence
1. The Tribunal shall be competent to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and punish any person or legal entity accused or guilty of:
a. A "grave breach" of Article II of the International Convention of the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid as defined in Article IV, 1; and,
b. Any other international crime as defined in Article IV, 2 of
this Convention and subject to any specific provisions of a Supplemental Agreement making a crime subject to the jurisdiction
of this Tribunal.
2. The Tribunal shall, subject to the provisions of the present Con-
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vention, exercise its competence in accordance with international
law whose sources are stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
3. The Competence of the Organs of the Tribunal shall be interpreted and exercised in light of the purposes of the Tribunal as
set forth in this Convention.
Article VI-Subjects Upon Whom the Tribunal Shall
Exercise Its jurisdiction
The Tribunal shall exercise its jurisdiction over natural persons
and legal entities as defined in Article XX.
Article VII-Sanctions
1. The Court as an organ of the Tribunal shall upon entering a
finding of guilty and in accordance with Article XXIV and standards set forth in this Convention have the power to impose the
following sanctions:
a. Deprivation of liberty or any lesser measures of control where
the person found guilty is a natural person; and,
b. Fines to be levied against a natural person or legal entity; and
c. Injunctions against natural persons or legal entities restricting them from engaging in certain conduct or activities.
2. Sanctions shall be established by the rules of the Court and
shall be published before their entry into effect. Such sanctions
shall be equivalent to those penalties existing in the major criminal
systems of the world for the same type of offense.
Second Part: The Penal Processes of the Tribunal
Article VIII-Initiation of Process
1. No criminal process shall be initiated unless a complaint is communicated to the Procuracy or originated within the Procuracy.
2. The Investigative Division of the Procuracy shall determine
whether such complaints are "manifestly unfounded" or not, and
that determination shall be reported immediately to the source of
the communication, if any.
3. No complaint by a State-Party to the present Convention or an
Organ of the United Nations shall be deemed "manifestly unfounded." Other States and Inter-governmental Organizations whose complaints are determined to be "manifestly unfounded" may appeal
such determinations to the Court pursuant to Article XII of this
Convention.
4. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, the Procuracy may either
take no further action on "manifestly unfounded" complaints or
may continue further investigation.
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5. Communications determined "not manifestly unfounded" shall
be transferred together with the record of investigation to the Prosecutorial Division of the Procuracy, which shall immediately inform
the accused and assume responsibility for development of the case.
6. When a case is ready for prosecution, the Procurator shall submit it to an appropriate Chamber of the Court pursuant to Article IX of this Convention, or to the Standing Committee pursuant
to Article XVII of this Convention, or to both, but if a case based
on a complaint submitted by a State-Party to this Convention or
by an Organ of the United Nations has not been presented to the
Court within one year of submission to the Standing Committee
the source of the complaint may request the Court to examine the
case and act pursuant to Article IX of this Convention.
Article IX-Pre-Trial Process
1. The Prosecutorial Division of the Procuracy may request an
appropriate Chamber of the Court pursuant to this Article of the
Convention to issue orders in aid of development of a case, in particular, orders in the nature of:
a. Arrest warrants;
b. Subpoenas;
c. Injunctions;
d. Search warrants;
e. Warrants for surrender of an accused so as to enable accused persons to be brought before the Court and to transit
States without interference.
2. Requests for such orders may be granted with or without prior
notice if opportunity to be heard would jeopardize the effectiveness of the requested order.
3. All such orders shall be executed pursuant to the relevant laws
of the State in which they are to be executed.
4. The ultimate merits of a case shall not be considered pursuant
to Article X of this Convention until the case has been submitted
to an appropriate Chamber of the Court, sitting in a preliminary
hearing at which the accused is represented by Counsel and the
Chamber, made the following determinations:
a. The case is reasonably founded in fact and lav;
b. No prior proceedings before the Tribunal or elsewhere bar
the process in accordance with the principle ne bis in idem or
fundamental notions of fairness; and
c. No conditions exist that would render the adjudication unreliable or unfair.
5. The schedule of proceedings shall be established by the appropriate Chamber in consultation with the Procuracy and Counsel for
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the accused with due regard to the principle of fairness to the
parties and the principle of "speedy trial."
Article X-Adjudication
1. Hearings on the ultimate merits of cases shall be conducted in
public before a designated Chamber of the Court but deliberations
of the Chamber shall be in camera.
2. A Chamber may at any time dismiss a case and enter appropriately motivated orders. In case of dismissal for any reason other
than on the merits, the principle ne bis in idem shall not apply.
3. In all proceedings a Chamber shall give equal weight to evidence and arguments presented by the Procurator and on behalf
of the accused in accordance with the principle of "equality of
arms" of the parties.
4. When all evidence respecting guilt or responsibility for wrongful acts has been presented, and argued by the parties, the Chamber
shall close the Hearings and retire for deliberations.
5. The decisions of the Chambers shall be publicly announced orally,
in summary or entirely, accompanied by written findings of fact
and conclusions of law, or entered 30 days from date of pronouncement of the oral decision, and any judge of that Chamber may
write a separate dissenting or concurring opinion.
6. A Determination of guilt shall be deemed entered when recorded by the Secretariat, which shall communicate it forthwith to the
Procuracy and the accused, but no such determination shall be
regarded as effective until 30 days after the date of recording at
which time the deciding Chamber may no longer modify its findings.
7. Each Chamber shall consist of three judges selected by lot, and
cases shall be assigned to each Chamber by lot.
Article XI-Sanctioning
1. Upon a Determination of guilt or responsibility, a separate hearing shall be held regarding sanctions to be imposed at which hearing evidence of mitigation and aggravation shall be introduced and
argued by the parties.
2. At the conclusion of this hearing the Chamber shall retire for
deliberation and shall issue its Determination in the same manner
and subject to the same conditions as for a Determination of guilt,
as set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article X.
Article XII-Appeals
1. Appeals to the Court en banc from Determinations of Chambers
as to guilt or responsibility or as to sanctions may be commenced
by the accused upon written notice filed with the Secretariat and
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communicated to the other party within 30 days of the date of
entry of judgment or order appealed.
2. Other appeals from actions of Chambers may be taken before
a final judgment is entered only if such actions are conclusive as
to independent matters.
3. The Procuracy may appeal questions of law in the same manner
as an accused under paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Decisions on Appeals shall be delivered in the same manner as
other decisions of the Court en banc as provided in Article X, paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Convention.
5. Decisions of the Court en bano and unappealed Determinations
or orders of Chambers shall be deemed final unless it is shown that:
a. Evidence unknown at the time of the Determination or order
has been discovered, which would have had a material effect
on the outcome of the said Determination or order; or,
b. The Court or Chamber was flagrantly misled as to the nature of matters affecting the outcome; or,
c. On the face of the record the facts alleged have not been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt; or,
d. The facts proved do not constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or,
e. Other grounds for which the Court may provide by its Rules.
6. Appealed determinations may be revised or vacated or remanded
for new Determination, and when vacating a Determination the
Court shall specify what if any ne bis in idem effect shall be given
to the prior proceedings.
Article XIII-Sanctions and Supervision
1. The Court may call upon any State-Party to execute measures
imposed in respect of guilt, in accordance with the laws of the
said State-Party.
2. With respect to each accused determined to be guilty, a judge
of the Court shall be selected by lot as Supervisor of the sanction
imposed.
3. All requests to modify sanctions shall be directed in the first
instance to the Sanction Supervising judge who may submit the
request to the Adjudicating Chamber for modification provided
such action in no way increases the sanction or conditions imposed
upon the person or legal entity found guilty.
4. Decisions of the Sanction Supervising Judges regarding modification requests may be appealed to the Chamber which imposed
the sanction, but such appeals in the Chamber's discretion need
not be the subject of full hearings and detailed written decisions.
5. Nothing herein precludes the Court in accordance with its Rules
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to suspend its sanctions or place pre-conditions to their application
in accordance with its Rules.
Third Part: Organs of the Tribunal
Article XIV-The Court
1. The Court shall consist of twelve judges, no more than two of
whom shall be of the same nationality, who shall be elected by
the Standing Committee of States-Parties from nominations submitted thereto.
2. Nominees for positions as judges shall be of distinguished experts in the fields of international criminal law or human rights
and other jurists qualified to serve on the highest courts of their
respective States who may be of any nationality or have no nationality.
3. Judges shall be elected by secret ballot and the Standing Committee of States-Parties shall strive to elect persons representing
diverse backgrounds and experience with due regard to representation of the major legal and cultural systems of the world.
4. Elections shall be coordinated by the Secretariat under the supervision of the presiding officer of the Standing Committee of
States-Parties and shall be held whenever one or more vacancies
exist on the Court.
5. Judges shall be elected for the following terms: four judges for
four-year terms, four judges for six-year terms, and four judges for
eight-year terms. Judges may be re-elected for any term at that
time available.
6. No judge shall perform any public function in any State.
7. Judges shall have no other occupation or business than that of
judge of this Court. However, judges may engage in scholarly activity for remuneration provided such activity in no way interferes
with their impartiality and appearance of impartiality.
8. A judge shall perform no function in the Tribunal with respect
to any matter in which he may have had any involvement prior to
his election to this Court.
9. A judge may withdraw from any matter at his discretion, or be
excused by a two-thirds majority of the judges of the Court for
reasons of conflict of interest.
10. Any judge who is unable or unwilling to continue to perform
functions under this statute may resign. A judge may be removed
for incapacity to fulfill his functions by a unanimous vote of the
other judges of the Court.
11. Except with respect to judges who have been removed, judges
may continue in office beyond their term until their replacements
are prepared to assume the office and shall continue in office to
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complete work on any pending matter in which they were involved
even beyond their term.
12. The judges of the Court shall elect a president, vice-president
and such other officers as they deem appropriate. The president
shall serve for a term of two years.
13. Judges of the Court shall perform their judicial functions in
three capacities:
a. Sitting with other judges as the Court en bane;
b. Sitting in panels of three on a rotational basis in Chambers;
and
c. Sitting individually as Supervisors of sanctions.
14. The salary of judges shall, be equal to that of the judges of
the International Court of Justice.
15. The Court en bane shall subject to the provisions of this Convention, adopt Rules governing procedures before its Chambers
and the Court en bane, and provide for establishment and rotation
of Chambers.
16. The Court en bane shall announce its decisions orally in full
or in summary, accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law at the time of the oral decision or within thirty days
thereafter, and any judge so desiring may issue a concurring or
dissenting opinion.
17. Decisions and orders of the Court en bane are effective upon
certification of the written opinion by the Secretariat, which is to
communicate such certified opinion to parties forthwith.
18. The Court en bane may within thirty days of the Certification
of the judgment enter its decisions without notice.
19. No actions taken by the Tribunal may be contested in any
other forum than before the Court en bane, and in the event that
any effort to do so is made, the Procurator shall be competent to
appear on behalf of the Tribunal and in the name of all StatesParties of this Convention to oppose such action.
20. States-Parties agree to enforce the final judgments of the Court
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
Article XV-The Procuracy
1. The Procuracy shall have as its chief officer the Procurator and
shall consist of an administrative division, an investigative division
and a prosecutorial division, each headed by a deputy procurator,
and employing appropriate staff.
2. The Procurator shall be elected by the Standing Committee of
States-Parties from a list of at least three nominations submitted
by members of the Standing Committee, and shall serve for a renewable term of six years, barring resignation or removal by two-
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thirds vote of the judges of the Court en bane for incompetence,
conflict of interest, or manifest disregard of the provisions of this
Convention or material Rules of the Tribunal.
3. The Procurator's salary shall be the same as that of the judges.
4. The deputy procurators and all other members of the Procurator's
staff shall be named and removed by the Procurator at will.
Article XVI-The Secretariat
1. The Secretariat shall have as its chief officer the Secretary, who
shall be elected by a majority of the Court sitting en bane and serve
for a renewable term of six years barring resignation or removal by
a majority of the Court sitting en bane for incompetence, conflict
of interest or manifest disregard of the Provisions of this Convention or material Rules of the Tribunal.
2. The Secretary's salary shall be equivalent to that of the judges.
3. The Secretariat shall employ such staff as appropriate to perform its chancery and administrative functions and such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Court that are consistent with
the provisions of this Convention and the Rules of the Tribunal.
4. In particular, the Secretary shall twice each year prepare:
a. Budget requests for each of the organs of the Tribunal; and
b. Make and publish an annual report on the activities of each
Organ of the Tribunal.
5. The Secretariat staff shall be appointed and removed by the
Secretary at will.
6. An annual summary of investigations undertaken by the Procuracy shall be presented to the Secretariat for publication, but
certain investigations may be omitted where secrecy is necessary,
provided that a confidential report of the investigation is made to
the Court and to the Standing Committee and filed separately with
the Secretariat, but either the Court or the Standing Committee
may order by majority vote that the report be made public.
Article XVII-The Standing Committee
1. The Standing Committee shall consist of one representative appointed by each State-Party.
2. The Standing Committee shall elect by majority vote a presiding officer and alternate presiding officer and such other officers
as it deems appropriate.
3. The presiding officer shall convene meetings at least twice each
year of at least one week duration each at the seat of the Tribunal,
and call other meetings at the request of a majority vote of the
Committee.
4. The Standing Committee shall have the power to perform the
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functions expressly assigned to it under this Convention, plus any
other functions that it determines appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Tribunal that are not inconsistent with this Convention, but in no way shall those functions impair the independence and integrity of the Court as a judicial body.
5. In particular, the Standing Committee may:
a. Offer to mediate disputes between States-Parties relating to
the functions of the Tribunal; and
b. Encourage States to accede to the Convention; and,
6. Propose to States-Parties international instruments to enhance
the functions of the Tribunal.
7. The Standing Committee may exclude from participation representatives of States-Parties that have failed to provide financial
support for the Tribunal as required by this Convention or StatesParties that failed to carry out their obligations under this Convention.
8. Upon request by the Procuracy, or by a party to a case presented for adjudication to a Chamber of the Court, the Standing
Committee may be seized with a mediation and conciliation petition. In that case the Standing Committee shall within 60 days
decide on granting or denying the petition from which there is no
appeal. In the event that the Standing Committee grants the petition, Court proceedings shall be stayed until such time as the Standing Committee concludes its mediation and conciliation efforts, but
not for more than one year except by stipulation of the Parties and
with the consent of the Court.
Article XVIII-General Institutional Matters
1. Each of the Organs of the Tribunal shall formulate and publish
its own Rules in accordance with the Standards set forth in the
Fourth Part to regulate its functions under this Convention, but
the Rules of the Procuracy and Secretariat shall be subject to approval by a majority of the Court en banc.
2. The Procurator shall participate without a vote in formulating
the Rules of the Court and of the Secretariat. The President of the
Court shall participate without a vote in formulating the Rules of
the Procuracy and of the Secretariat.
3. Except to the extent of the adopted Rules, procedures of the
Court shall be those of the International Court of Justice and those
of the Secretariat shall be as for the Registrar of the International
Court of Justice.
4. Each of the Organs of the Tribunal shall cooperate with the
Secretariat in formulating its budget request and such budget requests shall be presented to the Court en banc for modification or
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approval, subject to adoption or rejection in their entirety by the
Standing Committee.
5. The Judges, the Procurator and Deputy Procurators and their
assistants and the Secretary shall be deemed officers of the Court,
as well as Counsels appearing in a given case, and they shall enjoy
immunity from legal processes of States with respect to the performance of their official duties.
6. No officer of the Court other than Counsel in a given case shall
perform any function under this Convention without having first
made a public, solemn declaration of impartiality and adherence
to this Convention and the Rules of the Tribunal.
Fourth Part: Tribunal Standards
Article XIX-Standards for Rules and Procedures
1. In all proceedings of the Tribunal and in the formulation of
any Rules by any of its organs, the accused shall be entitled to those
fundamental human rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which for these purposes are:
a. The presumption of innocence
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of
criminal justice. It includes inter alia:
1. No one may be convicted or formally declared guilty
unless he has been tried according to law in a fair trial;
2. No criminal punishment or any equivalent sanction may
be imposed upon a person unless he has been proven guilty
in accordance with the law;
3. No person shall be required to prove his innocence;
4. In case of doubt the decision must be in favor of the
accused.
b. Procedural rights ("equality of arms")
The accused shall have substantial parity in proceedings and
procedures and shall be given effective ways to challenge any
and all evidence produced by the prosecution and to present
evidence in defense of the accusation.
c. Speedy trial
Criminal proceedings shall be speedily conducted without, however, interfering with the right of the defense to adequately
prepare for trial. To this effect:
1. Time limitations should be established for each stage of
the proceedings and should not be extended without reason
by the appropriate Chamber of the Court.
2. Complex cases involving multiple defendants or charges
may be severed by the appropriate Chamber of the Court
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when it is deemed in the interest of fairness to the parties
and justice to the case.
3. Administrative or disciplinary measures shall be taken
against officials of the Tribunal who deliberately or by negligence violate the provisions of this Convention and the
rules of this Tribunal.
d. Evidentiary questions
1. All procedures and methods for securing evidence which
interfere with internationally guaranteed human rights shall
be in accordance with the standards of justice set forth in
this Convention and in the rules of the Tribunal.
2. The admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings
must take into account the integrity of the judicial system,
the rights of the defense, the interests of the victim and the
interests of the world community.
3. Evidence obtained directly or indirectly by illegal means
which constitute a serious violation of internationally protected human rights, violate the provisions of this Convention, and Rules of this Tribunal shall hold them inadmissible.
4. Evidence obtained by means of lesser violations shall be
admissible only subject to the judicial discretion of the Court
on the basis of the veracity of the evidence presented and
the values and interests involved.
e. The right to remain silent
Anyone accused of a criminal violation has the right to remain
silent and must be informed of this right.
f. Assistance of counsel
1. Anyone suspected of a criminal violation has the right to
defend himself and to competent legal assistance of his own
choosing at all stages of the proceedings.
2. Counsel shall be appointed ex officio whenever the accused by reason of personal conditions is unable to assume
his own defense or to provide for such defense, and in those
complex or grave cases where in the best interest of justice
and in the interest of the defense such counsel is deemed
necessary by the Court.
3. Appointed counsel shall receive reasonable compensation
from the Tribunal whenever the accused is financially unable to do so.
4. Counsel for the accused shall be allowed to be present
at all critical stages of the proceedings.
5. Counsel for the accused or the accused shall be provided
with all incriminating evidence available to the prosecution
as well as all exculpatory evidence as soon as possible but
no later than at the conclusion of the investigation or before
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adjudication and in reasonable time to prepare the defense.
6. Anyone detained shall have the right to access and to
communicate in private with his counsel personally and by
correspondence, subject only to reasonable security measures
decided by a judge of the Court.
g. Arrest and detention
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
2. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as established
by this Convention and Rules of the Tribunal and only on
the basis of a determination by the Court.
3. No one shall be arrested or detained without reasonable
grounds to believe that he committed a criminal violation
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
4. Anyone arrested or detained shall be promptly brought
before a judge of the Court and shall be informed of the
charges against him; after appearance before such judicial
authority he may be returned to the custody of the arresting
authority but he shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the
Court even when in the custody of a State-Party.
5. Preliminary or provisional arrest and detention shall take
place only whenever necessary and as much as possible should
be reduced to a minimum of cases and to the minimum of
time.
6. Preliminary or provisional detention shall not be compulsory but subject to the determination of the Court and in
accordance with its Rules.
7. Alternative measures to detention shall be used whenever possible and include inter alia:
- bail
- limitations of freedom of movement
- imposition of other restrictions.
8. No detainee shall be subject to rehabilitative measures
prior to conviction unless he freely consents thereto.
9. No administrative preventive detention shall be permissible as part of any criminal proceedings.
10. Any period of detention prior to conviction shall be
credited toward the fulfillment of the sanction imposed by
the Court.
11. Anyone who has been the victim of illegal or unjustified
detention shall have the right to compensation.
h. Rights and interests of the victim
The rights and interests of the victim of a crime shall be protected and in particular:
1. the opportunity to participate in the criminal proceedings;
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2. the right to protect his civil interests;
3. due regard shall be given in formulation of Rules of the
Organs of the Tribunal to the principle of ne bis in idem,
but a seemingly duplicative prosecution shall not be barred
provided that the record in the prior proceeding is taken
into account along with any prior measures in respect of
guilt of the accused.
4. Arrest and detention shall be in conformity with the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners and the
Principles on Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
of the United Nations.
5. Maximum flexibility regarding restrictive measures should
be encouraged, including use of such mechanisms as house
arrest, work release and bail, and credit shall be given for
any pre-conviction restrictions to an accused.
6. The Tribunal shall include all of the above in the formulation of its Rules of Practice and Procedures which shall
be effective upon promulgation.
7. No proceedings before the Tribunal shall commence prior
to the promulgation of the Rules of Practice and Procedures
of the Court, the Procuracy and the Secretariat.
Fifth Part: Principles of Accountability (Provisions in the
Nature of a General Part)
Article XX-Definitions
1. An international crime is any offense arising out of the Provisions
of this Statute and any Supplemental Agreement thereto as defined
in Article IV.
2. A state is an international legal entity defined under international law.
a. This term is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or membership in the United Nations.
b. This term also includes a group of states acting collectively.
3. The words "person" or "individual" for the purposes of this
Convention are used interchangeably and each one of them refers
to a physical human being alive.
4. For the purposes of this Convention, the words "group" and
"organization" are interchangeable. A group consists of more than
one person, acting in concert with respect to the performance of
a particular act.
5. The term "entity" is used herein to include groups, organs of
state, states or groups of states.
6. Participation in group action is a person's conduct which directly contributes to the group's ability to perform a given act or
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which directly influences the decision of the group to perform a
given act.
7. A person commits solicitation when, with the intent that an
offense be committed, he instigates, commands, encourages or requests another to commit that offense.
8. A person commits conspiracy when, with intent to commit a
specific offense, he agrees with another to the commission of that
offense and one of the members of the conspiracy commits an overt
act in furtherance of the agreement.
9. A person commits an attempt when, with the intent to commit
a specific offense, he engages in unequivocal and direct conduct
which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that
offense and which if not for a fortuitous event or misapprehension
of the actor, would result in the completion of the crime.
10. A person in authority is a person who has legal authority under domestic law or a person who by virtue of the power structure
of a group is deemed to be in command or has the power to command others, and to whom obedience is generally expected.
11. Omission by a state, group or organization or failure to act
occurs whenever a person in authority having power to act and
having knowledge of the facts requiring action fails to take reasonable measures to prevent, or terminate the commission of a
crime or to apprehend, or prosecute, or punish any person who has
or may have committed a crime. Omission by an individual is conscious failure to act in accordance with a pre-existing legal obligation.
12. The masculine "he" used throughout this Article refers equally to the feminine "she."
Article XXI-Responsibility
1. A person is criminally responsible under this Article when he
reaches the age of eighteen.
2. Direct Personal Responsibility
a. a person who commits or attempts to commit a crime is
responsible for it and criminally punishable under Article XXIV.
b. A person who conspires with another or solicits another to
commit a crime as defined is criminally responsible for it and
criminally punishable.
c. A person who commits a crime is not relieved from responsibility by the sole fact that he was acting in the capacity of
Head of State, responsible government official, acting for or
on behalf of a state, or pursuant to "superior orders" except
where the provisions of Article XXIV, Para. 6 are applicable.
3. Responsibility for the Conduct of Others
a. A person is responsible for the conduct of another if, before,
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during or after the commission of a crime, and with the intent
to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he aids,
abets, solicits, conspires or attempts to aid another person in
the planning, perpetration or concealment of the crime, or facilitates the concealment or escape of a perpetrator.
b. A person is not responsible for the acts of others if that
individual is a victim of the crime, or when, before the commission of the crime, that person terminates his efforts of participation as described in Para. 3.a and such termination wholly
deprives others of his efforts and of their effectiveness or if
such a person gives timely warning and advice to appropriate
government authorities.
c. The vicarious responsibility for the conduct of another under
this Section is not dependent upon the conviction of a person
accused as a principal.
d. A person is responsible for the conduct of another with
respect to any crime committed in furtherance of a solicitation
or conspiracy, and for those crimes which are reasonably foreseeable to be committed by others in furtherance of a common
criminal scheme, design or plan.
4. Collective Responsibility
a. A group or organization other than a state or an organ of
a state is collectively responsible for its acts, irrespective of the
responsibility of its members.
b. A person is responsible for crimes committed by a group
or organization, if he knew of or could reasonably foresee the
commission of such crime and remained a member thereof.
5. Responsibility of Persons in Authority
a. A person in authority in a state, group or organization is
personally responsible for the commission of a crime when such
crime is committed at his instigation, suggestion, command or
request, or if he fails to act.
6. State Responsibility
a. Conduct for Which States are Responsible
1. A state is responsible for any crime committed on its behalf, behest or benefit by a person in authority, regardless
of whether such acts are deemed lawful under its municipal law.
2. Conduct is attributed to a state if it is performed by persons or groups acting in their official capacity, who under
the domestic law of that state possess the authority to make
decisions for the state or any political subdivision thereof or
possess the status of organs, agencies or instrumentalities of
that state or a political subdivision thereof.
3. Conduct outside the scope of authority of any of the en-
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tities listed in this Article is attributed to the state.
b. State Responsibility for Failure to Act
1. Failure to act by a state in accordance with its obligation under this Code shall constitute an international offense.
2. Any revolutionary movement which establishes a state or
overthrows a government is responsible in the new state or
new government to prosecute or extradite any individual
within such group or any individual who has been omitted
from the group for any international crime. Failure to do so
shall constitute a basis for state responsibility.
Article XXII-Elements of an InternationalCrime
1. Definition
a. An international crime shall contain four elements: a material
element, a mental element, a causal element and harm, as defined in paragraphs 2 through 5 inclusive, except when in the
definition of a given crime these requirements are altered.
2. Material Element
a. Any voluntary act or omission which constitutes part of a
crime as defined in Article IV will constitute the material
element.
3. Causal Element
a. Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent
but for which the result in question would not have occurred,
and that the result was a foreseeable consequence of such
conduct.
4. Harm
a. The element of harm shall depend upon the definition of
the crime, except where no harm is needed in the definition
of the crime.
5. Mental Element
a. The mental element of an offense at the time of the commission of the material element shall consist of either intent,
knowledge, or recklessness, unless the definition of the crime
specifies any of these three.
b. A person "intends" to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the law defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.
c. A person "knows" or acts "knowingly" when he is consciously
aware of the attendant circumstances of his conduct or of the
substantial probability of existing facts and circumstances likely
to produce a given result.
d. A person is "reckless" or acts "recklessly" when he consciously
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disregards a substantial and unreasonable risk that a likely result would be a foreseeable consequence of such conduct.
Article XXIII-Immunities
1. For purposes of this Article, no person shall enjoy any international immunity except that Head of State, Head of Government,
official representative of a state having diplomatic status, employees
of international organizations and the members of the families and
staffs of the above enumerated persons shall be exempt and immune
from the criminal process of all states other than their own and
this International Criminal Tribunal, provided that in the event
of the commission of a crime as defined herein, the State-Party
whose national is entitled to the immunity and exemption stated
herein shall undertake to investigate, prosecute and punish the
allegation or crime charged.
2. Any state may waive this immunity on behalf of its nationals
without prejudice to its interests in favor of any other state.
3. Any person who falls into any of the categories of Para. 1 of
this Article may specifically waive that immunity with the consent
of the state of which he is a national or of the international organization by which he is employed without prejudice to that state or
organization.
4. A person who no longer has the privileges of the positions covered by immunity in Para. 1 of this Article may no longer benefit
from said immunity except with respect to those acts committed
or alleged to have been committed while that person held the
position that granted immunity.
Article XXIV-Penalties
1. Punishability
a. All crimes defined in this Article are punishable in proportion to the seriousness of the violation, to the harm threatened
or caused, and to the degree of the responsibility of the individual actor in accordance with a schedule to be promulgated
by Rules of the Tribunal before it exercises its jurisdiction in
a given case.
2. Penalties for Individuals
a. Penalties for persons who have been convicted of the commission of a crime shall consist of imprisonment or such alternatives to imprisonment or fines as promulgated by the
International Criminal Court.
3. Penalties for a Group or Organization
a. Penalties for crimes for which groups are collectively responsible under Article XXI, Para. 4 shall consist of fines or
other sanctions established in accordance with the principle of
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proportionality set forth in Paragraph 1 of this Article and as
promulgated by the Rules of the Court.
b. Fines shall be collectively levied against the assets of group
and individual participants and enforced by the States-Parties
wherein such assets may be found.
4. Penalties for States
a. Penalties for states which are responsible for crimes shall
consist of fines assessed on the basis of proportionality as set
forth in Section 1 of this Article, without prejudice to the duties or reparations and civil damages.
b. Such fines shall be due from a state, provided that they do
not critically impair the economic viability of the state.
c. The determination and assessment of fines against a state
shall be made by the Court and the enforcement of such fines
shall be by and through the United Nations.
d. The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to the
rights and duties of the United Nations to impose sanctions
against a state as provided for in the United Nations Charter.
e. Special Remedies
Nothing in this article shall prevent the International Criminal
Court to rely on its inherent judicial power to order a state to
cease and desist from a given activity which is an international
crime or to order by injunctions the correction of previous violations and prevent their reoccurrence.
5. Multiple Crimes and Penalties
a. The Court may with respect to a single criminal transaction
involving the commission of more than one crime all of which
are related and are based on substantially the same facts impose a single penalty with discretion concerning aggravating
and mitigating circumstances as may be found by the Court.
6. Mitigation of Punishment
a. A person acting pursuant to superior orders may present
such a claim in mitigation of punishment.
b. Subject to the defense of double jeopardy a person who was
sentenced in one state for substantially the same criminal conduct and resentenced by the Court shall receive credit for any
part of a sentence already executed.
c. The Court may take into account any mitigating fact such
as imperfect or incomplete defenses stated in Article XXV.
Article XXV-Exoneration
1. Definition
a. A person shall be exonerated from responsibility arising under this Convention if in the commission of an act which con-
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stitutes a crime any of the defenses stated in Paragraphs 2
through 11 inclusive is applicable.
Self-Defense (Individual)
a. Self-Defense consists in the use of force against another person which may otherwise constitute a crime when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes that such force is necessary
to defend himself or anyone else against such other person's
imminent use of unlawful force, and in a manner which is
reasonably proportionate to the threat or use of force.
Necessity
a. A person acts under necessity when by reason of circumstances beyond his control, likely to create a private or public
harm, he engages in conduct which may otherwise constitute
a crime which he reasonably believes to be necessary to avoid
the imminent greater harm likely to be produced by such circumstances, but not likely to produce death.
Coercion
a. A person acts under coercion when he is compelled by another under an imminent threat of force or use of force directed
against him or another, to engage in conduct which may otherwise constitute a crime which he would not otherwise engage
in, provided that such coerced conduct does not produce a
greater harm than the one likely to be suffered and is not likely
to produce death.
Obedience to Superior Orders
a. A person acting in obedience to superior orders shall be exonerated from responsibility for his conduct which may otherwise constitute a crime or omission unless, under the circumstances, he knew that such act would constitute a crime.
Refusal to Obey a Superior Order Which Constitutes a Crime
a. No person shall be punished for refusing to obey an order of
his government or his superior which if carried out, would constitute a crime.
Mistake of Law or Fact
a. A mistake of law or a mistake of fact shall be a defense if
it negates the mental element required by the crime charged
provided that said mistake is not inconsistent with the nature
of the crime or its elements.
Double jeopardy
a. The Court may not retry or resentence the same individual
for the same conduct irrespective of what the crime or charge
may be.
b. In the event a person has been tried by the national courts
of a State-Party he could be retried for the same conduct by
the Court but he shall receive credit for a sentence rendered
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by a national criminal court and executed by that state or any
other state.
c. No individual who has been tried and convicted or acquitted
on the merits by the Court shall be retried or resentenced by
the domestic court of any State-Party.
d. Amnesty or pardon by any state shall not constitute a bar
to adjudication before the Court and shall not be deemed to
fall within the defense of double jeopardy.
9. Insanity
a. A person is legally insane when at the time of the conduct
which constitutes a crime, he suffers from a mental disease or
mental defect, resulting in his lacking substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law, and such mental disease or mental defect caused the conduct constituting a crime.
10. Intoxication or Drugged Condition
a. A person is intoxicated or in a drugged condition when
under the effect of alcohol or drugs at the time of the conduct
which would othervise constitute a crime he is unable to formulate the mental element required by the said crime.
b. Such a defense shall not apply to a person who engages in
voluntary intoxication with the pre-existing intent to commit
a crime.
c. With respect to crimes requiring the mental element of
recklessness, voluntary intoxication shall not constitute a defense.
11. Renunciation
a. It shall be a defense to the crimes of attempt, conspiracy
and solicitation if a person renounces or voluntarily withdraws
from the commission of the said crimes before any harm occurs
and if he has engaged in any individual activity by doing any
of the following:
(1) wholly deprives others from the use or benefit of his
participation in the commission of the crime;
(2) notifies law enforcement officials in time in order to
prevent the occurrence or the commission of the crime.
Article XXVI-Statute of Limitation
1. Duration
a. No prosecution or punishment by the Court of an international crime shall be barred by a period of limitations of lesser
duration than the maximum penalty ascribed to the crime in
question in the laws of the state where the crime was committed.
b. The period of limitation shall commence at the time that
legal proceedings under the provisions of this Convention may
commence but shall not apply to any period during which a
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person is escaping or evading appearance before the appropriate authorities. It is interrupted by the arrest of the accused but
shall recommence ab initio if the accused or convicted person
escapes and in no case shall it run for a period which would
be longer than twice the original period of limitation.
c. In the case of state responsibility, the period of limitation
for commencing any action before the Court shall be measured
with reference to the acts of those state officials whose conduct
has implicated the responsibility of the state in question.
Sixth Part: Duties of States-Parties
Article XXVII-General Principles
1. States-Parties shall surrender upon request of the Court any
individual where it appears that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such a person has committed an international crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
2. States-Parties shall provide the Court with all means of judicial
assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to letters
rogatory, service of writs, assistance in securing testimony and
evidence, transmittal of records and transfer of proceedings.
3. States-Parties shall recognize the judgments of the Court and
execute provisions of such judgments in accordance with their national laws.
4. In the event the Court does not have detentional facilities under
its direct control, States-Parties will honor requests from the Court
to execute its sentences in accordance with their own correctional
systems, but subject to continuing jurisdiction of the Court over
the transferred offender.
5. States-Parties may receive requests for transfers of offenders.
6. States-Parties to this Convention undertake to provide cooperation to organs of the Tribunal in accordance with the terms of this
Convention and the purpose of the Tribunal, and in particular to:
a. Provide financial support to the Tribunal in the proportion
they would be assessed under contemporaneous General Assembly apportionments established in Article 17 of the Charter of
the United Nations, payments being due within six months of
the adoption of a budget by the Standing Committee; and
b. Budgetary needs of the Tribunal shall be computed after
taking into account income from voluntary contributions and
fines collected by the Tribunal.
Article XXVIII-Surrender of Accused Persons
1. States-Parties shall surrender upon a request of the Court any
individual sought to appear before the Court for any proceeding
arising out of the Court's jurisdiction provided that the Court's
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request shall be based on reasonable grounds to believe that the
person sought has committed a violation of this Code.
2. The following acts shall not be a bar to surrender a person to
the International Penal Tribunal for any acts constituting a crime:
a. that the person sought to be surrendered claims or the state
wherein he may be located claims that the act falls within the
meaning of the "political offense exception";
b. that the individual is a national of the requested state;
c. that the requested state otherwise imposes certain conditions
or restriction to the practice of extradition to and from other
states.
3. Procedures regulating such transfers shall be determined by the
rules of the Court subject to the laws of the requested state.
Article XXIX-Judicial Assistance and Other Forms of Cooperation
1. The States-Parties shall provide the International Penal Tribunal
with all means of judicial assistance and cooperation including but
not limited to letters rogatory, service of writs, assistance in securing testimony and evidence, transmittal of records, transfer of
proceedings where applicable.
2. The procedures for such judicial assistance and other forms of
cooperation shall be determined by the Court's Rules of Practice.
Article XXX-Recognition of the Judgments of the International
Penal Tribunal
1. The States-Parties agree to recognize the judgments of the Court
and to execute its provisions. For the purposes of double jeopardy
and evidentiary matters the International Penal Tribunal shall recognize the sanctions of other States in accordance with the provisions of Article XXIV.
2. The Court's Rules of Practice shall govern the recognition of
the judgments of the Court by States-Parties and those of the other
States by the Court.
Article XXXI-Transfer of Offenders and Execution of Sentences
1. In the event the International Penal Tribunal does not have
detentional facilities under its direct control it may request a
State-Party to execute the sentence in accordance to that Party's
correctional system and in that case the Court shall continue to
exercise jurisdiction over the offender including his transfer to
another state or facility.
2. In the event the International Penal Tribunal has placed an
offender in its own detention facilities, this person may by agreement be transferred for detention to his country of origin subject
to the Court's jurisdiction.
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3. The Court's Rules of Practice shall determine the basis and condition of the transfer of offenders and the execution of sentences.
Seventh Part: Treaty Provisions
Article XXXII-Entry Into Force
1. This Convention is open for signature to all States, including
after its entry into force.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification, instruments of ratification being deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
3. Accession to this Convention shall be effected by deposit of an
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
4. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after
the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession, and
for States thereafter ratifying or acceding to this Convention, on
the thirtieth day after deposit of the applicable instrument.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all
signatory States of:
a. All signatures, ratifications, accessions and reservations to
this Convention; and
b. The date of entry into force of this Convention.
6. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Spanish, and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited
in the archives of the United Nations and copies thereof shall be
transmitted to all signatories.
Article XXXIII-Reservations
1. States may make any reservations to this Convention but shall
not be deemed States-Parties for the purposes of representation in
the Standing Committee if the reservation is as to a material aspect
of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, competence and the effects of its
judgments.
2. The Secretary-General shall keep separate count of signatories
making reservations not in conformity of Paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article XXXIV-Initial Implementation Steps
1. Upon entry into force of this Convention, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations shall call the first meeting of the Standing
Committee, and shall preside over that meeting until a presiding
officer is chosen.
2. The Standing Committee shall undertake as its first order of
business measures toward election of judges of the Court.
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Article XXXV-Amendments
1. This Convention may at any time be amended by a vote of
three-fourths of the members of the Standing Committee, subject
to ratification of such amendments by the same number of StatesParties represented in the Standing Committee.
2. Upon petition by a State-Party to the Standing Committee the
jurisdiction of the Court may be expanded to include additional
crimes or classes of offenders and measures in respect of guilt
when this is sought by a State capable of exercising compulsory
process upon the accused; and this may be on either an ad hoc
or permanent basis and shall be embodied in a Supplemental Agreement between the requesting state and the presiding officers of the
Standing Committee acting for and on behalf of the said Standing
Committee.
COMMENTARY to the Draft Convention on the Establishment of an
International Penal Tribunal for the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid and Other InternationalCrimes

General Observations
The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid (hereinafter referred to as Apartheid Convention) in Article V is the only international convention which specifically contemplates an "international penal tribunal." No other international convention, which has as its objective to criminalize a certain
conduct, contains a similar requirement. In fact only the Convention
on the Protection and Punishment of Genocide incidentally recognizes
the eventual jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court. The introductory notes to this Study, pages 1-39, seek to retrace the history
of the creation of an International Criminal Court and cite appropriate
authorities. It remains, however, that the only international legislative
authority for an International Penal Tribunal is the Apartheid Convention. Consequently, this Draft Convention relies on this legislative basis
as its authoritative source. Thus, having secured an international legislative basis, nothing precludes the States-Parties to this Draft Convention
from enlarging upon its jurisdiction by a device referred to in this Draft
Convention as "Supplemental Agreement" in order to permit the International Penal Tribunal to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and
punish other conventional international crimes.
The approach though characterizable as the "Direct Enforcement
Model" [See M. C. Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: A Draft
International Criminal Code (1980)] meaning the existence of an international system for the investigation, prosecution, adjudication and
punishment of international crimes is nevertheless dependent upon
States-Parties for substantial aspects of its functioning. Thus there is
in this approach still much of the "Indirect Enforcement Model" which
characterizes contemporary international criminal law in that states as-
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sume certain international duties which they enforce through their
national system. In that respect the enforcement mechanisms of the
International Penal Tribunal rely on the "Indirect Enforcement Model."
Such an approach by necessity must not only rely on the voluntary
compliance of states, but must also accept the inherent differences of
national legal systems through which enforcement of the Tribunal's
functions and orders are to be channeled.
The Court and the investigative and prosecutorial functions are
internationally institutionalized, as is contemplated by the 1979 International Law Association Draft Statute of an International Criminal
Court and its 1978 Draft Statute For An International Commission of
Criminal Inquiry. Such institutional mechanisms solve some problems,
but not others due to the absence of an international legislative apparatus.
To remedy this situation a quasi-legislative body is created in the
form of the "Standing Committee of States-Parties" vhich is given
policy and administrative functions. Furthermore a rule-making power
is given to the Organs of the Tribunal subject to certain "Standards" of
international fairness embodied in the Draft Convention.
The administrative needs of the Court are met by a Secretariat,
which also provides support to the other Organs of the Tribunal and
serves as a vehicle for assuring that record-keeping and registry functions as well as other requirements essential to fairness and effectiveness are met.
In view of the conceptual framework chosen and outlined above,
an appropriate organizational approach was adopted in the formulation
of the sequence of the Provisions of the Draft Convention:
First Part: Nature of the Tribunal and Its Organs and Powers
Purposes
Article I
Nature of the Tribunal
Article II
Organs of the Tribunal
Article III
Jurisdiction
Article IV
Competence
Article V
Subjects Upon Whom the Tribunal Shall
Article VI
Exercise Its Jurisdiction
Article VII
Sanctions
Second Part: The Penal Processes of the Tribunal
Initiation of Process
Article VIII
Pre-Trial Process
Article IX
Adjudication
Article X
Sanctioning
Article XI
Appeals
Article XII
Sanctions and Supervision
Article XIII
Third Part: Organs of the Tribunal
The Court
Article XIV
The Procuracy
Article XV
The Secretariat
Article XVI
The Standing Committee
Article XVII
General Institutional Matters
Article XVIII
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Fourth Part: Tribunal Standards
Article XIX

Standards for Rules and Procedures

Fifth Part: Principles of Accountability (Provisions in the
Nature of a General Part)
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article

XX
XXI
XXII
XXIII
XXIV
XXV
XXVI

Definitions
Responsibility
Elements of an International Crime
Immunities
Penalties
Exoneration
Statute of Limitation

Sixth Part: Duties of States-Parties
General Principles
Article XXVII
Surrender of Accused Persons
Article XXVIII
Judicial Assistance and Other Forms of
Article XXIX
Cooperation
Recognition of the Judgments of the InternaArticle XXX
tional Penal Tribunal
Transfer of Offenders and Execution of
Article XXXI
Sentences
Seventh Part: Treaty Provisions
Article XXXII
Entry Into Force
Reservations
Article XXXIII
Initial Implementation Steps
Article XXXIV
Amendments
Article XXXV

FIRST PART: NATURE OF THE TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS
AND POWERS
This text relies in part on Article I of the 1953 United Nations

Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (9 GAOR
Supp. XII, U.N. Doc. A/2645 1954), prepared by the International Law
Commission, hereinafter referred to as 1953 ILC Draft and the Draft

Statute of an International Criminal Court of the International Law
Association of May 1979 in proceedings of the International Law Associations' Belgrade Conference, 1980, pg. 11, hereinafter referred to
as 1979 ILA Draft.
Article I-Purposes. Establishes an International Penal Tribunal
which is to be a new international legal institution consisting of several
organs discussed in Article III below. The legislative authority of the
Tribunal and, of course, all of its organs is predicated on Article V of
the Apartheid Convention. But this Draft Convention provides StatesParties with the opportunity to include by Supplemental Agreement,
within the jurisdiction of the Court, other international crimes which
are defined in Article IV, 2. See also Appendix 2, a listing of international instruments.
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Article Il-Nature of the Tribunal. Considers the Tribunal as a
newly created institution and in order to minimize logistical problems
the suggested location is the Palace of Justice in The Hague; it is
already established and equipped as an international judicial body.
The official languages are those of the U.N. which represent a recognized world consensus.
Article HIl-Organs of the Tribunal. Establishes four bodies with
separate functions and purposes which are described throughout the
Second Part in the allocation of their respective duties in connection
with the penal processes but which are more adequately described in
the Third Part though that Third Part deals more with the institutional
and operational aspects of these organs. It is important at this juncture
to conceptualize the inter-relationship of these organs which are with
respect to the Court, the Procuracy and the Secretariat very similar
to the traditional organs of the national penal systems of most countries of the world. Clearly an attempt has been made to integrate different institutional concepts which are represented by the major criminal justice systems of the world [see Bassiouni, "A Survey of Major
Criminal Justice Systems of the World" in Handbook of Criminology
ed. D. Glaser (1974)]. In effect, the Court as an organ of the Tribunal
and its functions does not differ from its traditional role in any legal
system. The distinguishing characteristics pertaining to the role of the
judges and the degree of their discretion in the conduct of the proceedings are left to the formulation of the Rules of the Court which are
to be promulgated as specified in Article XVIII and subject to those
minimum standards of fairness embodied in international instruments
for the protection of human rights which are stated in the Fourth Part.
The Procuracy is a combination of the Soviet Union and Eastern
European Socialist systems [see M. C. Bassiouni and V. Savitski, The
Criminal Justice System of the U.S.S.R. (1979)]; the judge of instruction
in the Romanist-Civilist system [M. Ancel and Y. Marx, Les Code Penaux
Europeens, three volumes (1958)] and the Common Law System's prosecutor [Archbold Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases
(39th ed.) S. Mitchell ed. (1976) and Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave, J. Israel,
Modern Criminal Procedure (1980)]. In balance there is more emphasis
toward the Romanist-Civilist tradition than to the Common Law tradition
since it would be more consonant with the need for effective investigation and prosecution of international crimes subject to the guarantees
enunciated in the Fifth Part which are adequate to secure individual
human rights protection.
The Secretariat fulfills the traditional administrative support functions as well as the functions of court registrar.
The Standing Committee is a novelty in the structural approach to
the creation of new international institutions. To a large extent the
Standing Committee is to the organs of the Tribunal what the General
Assembly is to the United Nations. It represents the States-Parties, assists in insuring compliance with the provisions of the Convention and
oversees the administrative and financial affairs of the Tribunal.
Article IV-jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited
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to what is defined in Paragraph 1 as "grave breaches" of the Apartheid
Convention. The analogy here is to the conception of grave breaches
in the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto [For the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces of the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; For
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, 19 June 1977,
(ICRC, August-September, 1977)]. In addition, Paragraph 2 defines those
additional international crimes which may be part of the court's jurisdiction by Supplemental Agreement and binding only upon the StatesParties entering into such an Agreement with the Standing Committee.
International crimes, however, are limited to those so declared in a
multilateral convention and which can be so construed by the institution
of penal procedures or the obligation to prosecute or extradite. This
embodies the maxim aut dedere aut judicare which characterizes international crimes (see Appendix 1).
Paragraph 3 establishes the Tribunal's jurisdiction over such crimes
and, of course, over persons and entities charged with them as universal in terms of its scope and in terms of the power of the Court.
The 1953 ILC Draft does not define the crimes to be dealt with
beyond the phrase "crimes generally recognized under international law,"
whereas the 1979 ILA Draft incorporates by reference definitions of
crimes in sixteen international conventions, but notably omitting the
Apartheid Convention.
Article V-Competence. While penal theoreticians may argue the
merits of a distinction between jurisdiction and competence, it is suggested that jurisdiction establishes the Tribunal's geographic and subjectmatter authority, and in personam authority, while competence determines the specific powers of the Court with respect to its jurisdiction
and provides the legal framework of reference for the Tribunal's exercise of its jurisdictional authority.
Article VI-Subjects Upon Whom the Tribunal Shall Exercise Its
jurisdiction. Though Article IV on jurisdiction refers to the Court's
authority over natural persons and legal entities, it was deemed of importance to emphasize this authority under a separate article though it
may appear duplicative.
Article VII-Sanctions. Only the Court upon a finding of guilty,
subject to the provisions of this Convention, the procedures and Rules
which would be developed by the different Organs and the Standards
of fairness set forth in the Fifth Part, can impose a sanction against a
natural person or legal entity. Clearly deprivation of liberty applies
to natural persons and not to legal entities but fines and injunctions
apply to natural persons and legal entities. It is to be noted that
there is no schedule of penalties affixed to any specific crime and that
to some may raise a question of nulla poena sine lege. To avoid this
problem the Convention preconizes that the Court shall enact appro-
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priate and specific Rules on sanctions to be promulgated prior to the
Tribunal's commencement of activities which would satisfy the element
of notice. There is, however, the objection that such penalty will apply
to persons who have committed "grave breaches" of the Apartheid Convention or violations of other international conventions made subject
to the Court's jurisdiction by Supplemental Agreement (as discussed
in the Commentary to Article I and IV) before the promulgation of
these sanctions. In effect this would be tantamount to applying a penalty
which was not promulgated at the time of the commission of a given
crime. In some ways this may be deemed a violation of the principle
nulla poena sine lege though it could be argued that if the penalty
is commensurate or equivalent to the same penalty provided for in the
State where the crime was committed for equivalent crimes the objection would lose much of its substance. If, however, the sanction is to
be the same as that for the equivalent crime in the national legal system
wherein the international crime had been committed the principle nulla
poena sine lege would be complied with.
Second Part: The Penal Processes of the Tribunal
Article VIII-Initiation of Process. The desirability of such a process has
substantial support. See G.A. Res. 1187 (XII) 11 November 1957. See
Report of the Secretary-General on "International Criminal Jurisdiction,"
U.N. GAOR (XII) 1957, Doe. A/13649; see also U.N. Historical Survey on
the Question of the InternationalCriminal Jurisdiction Doc. A/CN.4/7,
Rev. 1 (1949). For a documentary history of the various projects for the
creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, see B. Ferencz, The
International Criminal Court (1980) 2 Vols. See also, J. Stone and R.
Woetzel, Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court (1970); 35
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal No. 1-2 (1964) devoted to that subject, and 45 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal No. 3-4 (1974) containing the contributions of the AIDP to V U.N. Congress on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice, Geneva, September 1975 devoted to
the subject of "La Creation d'une Justice Penale Internationale." The
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal contained scholarly writings on
this subject in its issues of 1928, 1935, 1945 and 1952 as well as others.
The AIDP has traditionally supported the creation of an international
criminal court as witnessed by the positions it has taken at its various
International Congresses, and those of its distinguished members among
them: Pella, Donnedieu de Vabres, Saldana, Graven, Jimenez de Asua,
Setille, Cornil, Bouzat, Jescheck, Romoshkiin, Herzog, Glaser, Dautricourt, Quaintano-Rippoles Arroneau, Mueller, De Schutter, Triffterer,
Lombois, Plawski, Ferencz, Oehler, Zubkowski. As Secretary-General
of the AIDP this writer has consistently supported the proposition. Because of the numerous writings on the subject by the above mentioned
scholars and others it would be impossible to cite them all. For three
more recent initiatives resulting in the submission of a draft statute,
see the International Law Association, "Draft Statute for an Interna-
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tional Commission of Criminal Injury" adopted by its International
Criminal Law Committee in Paris May 1978 Proceedings of the International Law Association (Belgrade Conference 1980) p. 4; and "Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Court," World Peace through Law,
Abidjan World Conference August 1973 (edited by Robert K. Woetzel);
and a "Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court" prepared by
the Foundation for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, see
also, K. de Haan, "The Procedural Problems of a Permanent International Criminal Jurisdiction" in De bestraffing van inbreuken tegen het
oorlogs-en het humanitair recht (A. Beirlaen, S. Dockx, K. de Haan,
C. Van den Wijngaert, eds., 1980) p. 191.
The 1953 ILC Draft in Article 29 provides that the penal processes
could commence only by action of a State-Party. The 1979 ILA Draft
in Article 23 allows only States to approach the Commission which at
its turn would present a case to the Court. The procedures presented
herein differ from the 1953 ILC Draft and 1979 ILA Draft in that it
concentrates the investigation and prosecution of any case with the
Procuracy, but a State-Party, Organ of the U.N., Inter-Governmental
Organization, Non-Governmental Organization and individual may file
a complaint with the Procuracy which shall accept such communications.
The Procuracy then makes an initial determination as to whether the
complaint is "not manifestly unfounded" or "manifestly unfounded."
That determination is quite similar to the one made by the European
Commission on Human Rights as to complaints concerning violations
of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Procuracy is not without controls as to its discretion in that a State-Party
and an organ of the U.N. are entitled to recognition of their complaints
as being "not manifestly unfounded" while other States and Inter-Governmental Organizations are entitled to an appeal to the Court of a
determination by the Procuracy that the complaint has been found
"manifestly unfounded." Communications and complaints by individuals
and Non-Governmental Organizations are not entitled to the same status.
The Procuracy's decisions are thus reviewable in the case of certain
complaints and communications and a decision holding a complaint
"not manifestly unfounded" will then travel two alternate channels: (a)
the possibility of mediation and conciliation through the Standing Committee; (b) adjudication before the Court. A period of one year is allowed for the conciliation process which is the same period allowed for
the Procuracy's investigation and preparation of the case. Thereafter the
case may be presented to the Court at the request of the complaining
State-Party or Organ of the U.N. if it is the initiator of the complaint.
Otherwise that period of one year is extendable subject to the Court's
review.
Article IX-Pre-Trial Process. A non-exhaustive list of orders that
may be issued by the Court in aid of the preparation of a case is specified. It is expected that the Rules of the Court will go into the details
of the form, content, and other formalities pertaining to these orders.
They are among the traditional powers of either a Court, or a judge of
instruction, respectively, in the Common Law and Romanist-Civilist
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tradition. Similar provisions may be found in the 1953 ILC Draft, Articles 40, 41, and 42 and in the 1979 ILA Draft, Articles 36 and 37. It
must be noted here that the Tribunal in general and the Court in
particular will in this and in other respects rely on the cooperation of
the States-Parties to implement its orders. It must also be noted that
where a State-Party has with a State non-Party, treaties or relations on
the subject of extradition and judicial assistance and cooperation, the
Courts' orders and determinations of any sort would have an impact
beyond that State-Party and thus give this Convention a multiplier
effect with respect to its impact. [See e.g., V.E.H. Booth, British Extradition Law and Procedure (1980); C. Van den Wijngaert, The Political
Offence Exception to Extradition (1980); M.C. Bassiouni, International
Extradition and World Public (1974); I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (1971); T. Vogler, Auslieferingsrecht und Grundgesetz
(1969); Bedi, International Extradition (1968); A. Billot, Traite de l'Extradition(1874); and M. Pisani and F. Mosconi, Codice delle Convenzioni
di Estradizione E Di Assistenza Giudiziaria in Materia Penale (1979).]
The observations made herein are also relevant to the Sixth Part on
the Duties of States-Parties since such duties will not only extend to
the carrying out of the obligations of this Convention within their own
territories but also whenever possible in their relations with other States.
It is clear that the carrying out and execution of all such obligations to
assist the Tribunal where required by this Convention, and in particular
the Sixth Part, but a State-Party is only requested to act pursuant to
its relevant national laws. It must, however, be noted that a State-Party
cannot enact national laws which will frustrate the carrying out of the
obligations arising under this Convention.
Paragraph 4 establishes a procedure analogous to an indictment,
such as was proposed in Articles 33 to 35 and 31 of the 1953 ILC and
1979 ILA Drafts, respectively, by means of a Committing Chamber in
the former and Commission processes in the latter. Under the present
draft, however, this process is but a step toward determination as to
guilt, it being unnecessary to give it special consequences because prior
procedures in the Procuracy have been given appropriate consequences
and progress under the present draft after the initial Procuracy action
is gradual rather than involving thresholds.
The subparagraph a determination is primarily for the sake of efficiency, as a means of detecting any errors by the Procuracy as to the
suitability of the matter for further action. Subparagraph b provides
an opportunity for early consideration of whether misconduct in preparation of the case may have impugned the Tribunal's integrity in such
a way to impair credibility or acceptability of its determinations, as
well as for early consideration of ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) problems. [See M. C. Bassiouni, Substantive CriminalLaw (1978), pp. 499-512].
Subparagraph c is particularly intended to deal with the need to
consider the possibility that non-cooperation of States, particularly nonParties, may render evidence of either incriminatory or exculpatory
character unavailable, so that a fair trial of the case may be impossible.
Early detection of problems of this type would not only be more ef-
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ficient but also would tend to avoid unnecessary and difficult ne bis
in idem questions regarding aborted proceedings.
Article X-Adjudication.
Paragraph 1 parallels Articles 39 of the 1953 ILC Draft and 35 of
the 1979 ILA Draft, conforming more closely to the latter, which makes
no express provision for secret sessions. This treatment appears appropriate in that any confidential evidence may be submitted in public in
a form or manner that protects essential matters of confidentiality such
as identity of a witness or a particular technique for obtaining evidence,
and the details for such presentations may be treated in rules of the
Court and Procuracy, which may be elaborated at a time when the
actual needs in this regard are clearer.
Paragraph 2 describes the inherent power of courts to dismiss cases,
particularly in respect of evidentiary problems. Article 38, paragraph 4,
of the 1953 ILC Draft has a similar dismissal provision. No express
provision is made for withdrawal of a matter, as was done in Articles
43 and 38 of the ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively, it being implicit in
the nature of the powers of the Procuracy to determine whether to take
such action.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 are self-explanatory.
It is contemplated that rules of the Court will address ne bis in
idem issues. Paragraph 3, it should be noted, relates to the principle
of equality of arms, which has been observed under the European Convention on Human Rights. [Applications No. 596/59 and 789/60, Franz
Pataki and Johann Dunshirn vs. Austria, Report of the Commission of
28 March 1963, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights
pp. 730, 734 (1963).]
Paragraph 6 is in part motivated by the availability of appeal and
also the fact that Chambers, being constituted on a rotational basis, may
be unavailable in their prior form for subsequent arguments. Details of
the rotational constitution of Chambers are left for elaboration in
Court- rules.
Article XI-Sanctioning. These provisions are sell-explanatory, but
this Article is to be read in pari materia with Article VII and the Commentary thereto and Articles XIII and XXIV.
Article XII-Appeals.
Appeals from Chambers, Determinations and Orders, which may
be done only on behalf of an accused or the Procuracy on questions of
law, are permitted including post-conviction orders. This is consonant
with the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights concerning the dual level of judgment and review.
No appeal is permitted for accuseds under Articles 49 and 43 of the
ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively. Also interlocutory appeals are permitted as practical necessity may require them.
Paragraph 5 on revision of judgments parallels Articles 52 and 45
of the ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively, but is broader in scope.
Article XIII-Sanctions and Supervision.
Paragraph 1 corresponds to Article 46 of the 1979 ILA Draft, Article
51 of the 1953 Draft having left such matters to future conventions. The
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terminology "sanctions" is capable of including not only punishments
of imprisonment or fines but also levies of compensation or injunctive
orders, thus maintaining the possibility for such broad ranges of action.
As noted previously, the supervisory mechanism of Paragraph 2
replaces the Clemency and Parole Boards provided by the ILC and
ILA Drafts, and appeal is made possible under Paragraph 3.
It should be noted that these provisions govern only the procedures
relating to sanctions. Standards relating to sanctions may be elaborated
further in Court rules but subject to Article XXIV.
Third Part: Organs of the Tribunal
Article XIV-The Court.
Except for mechanical differences, the terms of this Article as to se-

lection, tenure and replacement of judges closely parallel those of Articles 4 through 12 and 15 through 20 of the 1953 ILC Draft and 3
through 9 and 12 through 15 of the 1979 ILA Draft, although the latter
makes no provision for removal of judges.
This Article represents an innovation, in that the other drafts dealt
with a single court organ and created a separate Clemency and Parole
Board. As discussed below, the provision for separate functions of
Chambers and the Court en banc permits appeals, a right called for in
Article 14, Paragraph 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Rather than create a separate institution to deal with
such matters as clemency and parole it was deemed more efficient to
have such functions performed by individual judges, subject to possible
appeals from their decisions, as discussed in connection with Article XII.
Paragraph 5 contemplates that judges will be elected with reference
to specific terms. Accordingly, when a given judge is considered for
re-election, any of the terms that are vacant at that time may be regarded as available for that judge.
Paragraph 7 addresses the concern that any conduct by a judge
may create an appearance of impropriety, and narrowly circumscribes
permitted non-Court activity.
Paragraph 11 is intended to permit judges to remain in their official
capacity for the sole purpose of completing work on Court action begun
prior to expiration of their terms.
Paragraph 12, it should be noted, does not bar re-election of the
Court president.
Article XV-The Procuracy. The significance of the three-part division of the Procuracy is apparent in connection with budgets and
reports and transfer of cases from investigative to prosecutorial divisions,
as well as to the rights of the accused.
Paragraph 2, providing for joint action by the Court and Standing
Committee for selection of a Procurator, appears appropriate because
such an officer should be politically acceptable and States are in a
superior position to become aware of suitable candidates, while the
Court is in a superior position to judge legal competence and estimate
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probable devotion to impartiality. Removal power is vested in the Court
in the belief that deficiencies of the kind the Court would be likely to
note would be the appropriate bases for dismissal.
Deputies are placed under control of the Procurator in Paragraph 4
in the interest of effective management.
Article XVI-The Secretariat.
Although most of the functions of the Secretariat are ministerial in
character, its duties to oversee communications and prepare reports
serve an inspectorate function as well. Accordingly, control over the
Secretariat is vested in the Court, as a neutral body.
Article XVII-The Standing Committee.
The 1953 ILC Draft assumed that the Court created under it would
be a part of the United Nations, and therefore any governing-body
needs or political issues regarding its operations would be addressed by
the political organs of the United Nations, especially the General Assembly. Under the 1979 ILA Draft, a similar assumption appears to
have been made in that no treaty-type provisions are included and,
although references are made to "Contracting Parties," this term appears
to mean only States that have consented to be subject to operation of
the Court. Nevertheless, the Commission contemplated in the ILA Drafts
would have had a somewhat political character, in that only nationals
of States consenting to be subject to operations of the Commission,
could have been members and the Commission's own statute is referred
to as a "Convention" in its Article 3.
The present Statute, in contrast, would be entirely conventional in
character, although there are various express provisions for coordination
of action with the United Nations. Accordingly, the need for an organ
to deal with governance of the Tribunal and political issues relating to
its activities promoted provision for a Standing Committee. It should
be noted that the express functions of the Standing Committee are of
a governing-body nature for the most part, and that its functions beyond
these are largely unspecified. This would permit the representatives of
States-Parties who constitute that organ to have wide flexibility in pursuing non-juridical matters helpful to international criminal justice. The
requirement of meetings twice a year assures that the Standing Committee will be available for consultation on political questions.
One of the most significant functions of the Standing Committee
may be in Article XVII, Paragraph 6 with respect to proposing action
to initiate and propose new norms of international criminal law or standards for its application by the Tribunal. In view of the vagueness of
existing instruments purporting to define international crimes, such proposals and adoption may be essential in order that criminal responsibility
may be dealt with without violating the principle of nulla poena sine

lege.
It should be noted that this Article does not contemplate deprivation
of the status of State-Party in response to non-payment of financial
support, but mere suspension.
No provision has been made for terms of representatives, it being
assumed that their tenure shall be at the pleasure of the appointing State.
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Article XVIII-General Institutional Matters.
Paragraph 1 rules, it should be noted, are subject to further provisions in Article XIX. Recognition that flexibility should be provided
for such Rules was expressed in Article 24 of the 1953 ILC Draft and
Article 10 of the 1979 ILA Draft. Court approval of Rules for the Procuracy and Secretariat appear appropriate in view of the need to assure
that such rules are fair and conform to legal requirements. Participation by the Procurator in formulation of Court Rules recognizes the
desirability that such Rules interrelate properly with Procuracy procedures and capabilities.
Paragraph 2 gives the Court, a neutral body, a key role in shaping
the budget of the Tribunal, but leaves a veto power with the Standing
Committee, which represents the States obliged to meet the budget.
Prior draft statutes did not deal in detail with budgetary approval. See
1953 ILC Article 23 and 1979 ILA Article 17.
Paragraph 5 parallels Article 14 of the 1953 ILC Draft, which has
no counterpart in the 1979 ILA Draft, as to judges. Expansion to other
Tribunal officers is clearly appropriate. Expansion to other parties before the Court is necessary in the interest of fairness. [See, e.g., the
European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings
of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights (Council of
Europe, May 1969; E.T.S. No. 69).
Paragraph 6's requirement of a solemn declaration parallels Article
13 of the 1953 ILC Draft and Article 11 of the 1979 ILA Draft, but is
expanded to include officers of the Tribunal.]

Fourth Part: Tribunal Standards
Article XIX-Standards for Rules and Procedures. The Standards
of fairness which are to be guaranteed in all proceedings before the
Organs of the Tribunal and which are to be reflected in the Rules to
be promulgated by the said Organs embodying those rights are contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1980 Body of
Principles on the Protection of Persons from All Forms of Arbitrary
Arrest and Detention, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the 1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. These standards are also embodied
in the resolutions of the XIIth International Congress of Penal Law
held in Hambourg 1979 whose draft and explanatory notes are in 49
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal vol. 3, 1978. These provisions are
particularly consonant with the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Additional Protocols.
[See A. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (1977), and D. Poncet, La
Prbtection de l'Accus6 par la Convention Europeenne des Droits de
rHomme (1977). See also, e.g., L. Sohn and T. Buergenthal, International
Protection of Human Rights (1973).]
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Fifth Part: Principles of Accountability (Provisions in the
Nature of a General Part)
The Principles of Accountability set forth in the Sixth Part are from
the General Part of the Draft International Criminal Code in M. C.
Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal
Code (Sijthoff 1980) pg. 141 and excerpts thereof following hereinafter.
Article XX-Definitions.
1. defines international crimes with reference to the Convention, thus
permitting expansion.
2. incorporates by reference the definition of a state as recognized under international law. This approach was preferred to repetition of one
of the generally accepted formulations of a definition of a state because
use of such a formulation would call for definition of the terms used in
it, such as the Montevideo Convention's provision that a state has the
capacity to conduct "international relations," Convention on Rights and
Duties of States of 26 December 1933, 165 U.N.T.S. 19; see also U.N.
debates on statehood in connection with Israel and Liechtenstein at 3
U.N. SCOR, 383d Mtg., Dec. 2, 1948, No. 128 pp. 9-12; and 4 U.N. SCOR
432d Mtg., July 27, 1949, No. 35 at pp. 4-5.
For the sake of convenience, the term "state" is deemed to include
groups of states acting collectively.
3. exemplifies a correlation between "person" and "individual," and
confines the meaning of those terms to exclude such entities as corporations or other so-called juridical persons.
4. and 5. begins with another correlation for the sake of convenience,
with respect to the term "group" and "organization." The definition is
provided because of the use of these terms in provisions dealing with
collective responsibility, which is discussed below.
6. on participation in a group action is designed for the same purpose.
The model of responsibility arose out of the Nuremberg trials and
Tokyo war crimes trials. [See Article 9 of the London Charter of 8
August 1945, Control Council Ordinance No. 10 of 20 December 1945;
for a discussion of the basis of this responsibility and the cases decided
at Nuremberg and Tokyo, see L. Friedman, The Law of War: A Documentary History (1972); see also Wright, History of the U.N. War Crimes
Commission (1949).]
7. and 8. are basically the provisions of the Model Penal Code relating
to solicitation and conspiracy, American Law Institute Model Penal
Code (1962). [See generally M. C. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law
(1978), and W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law (1972); see also for
a comparison with the German Penal Code, G. Fletcher, Rethinking
CriminalLaw (1978).]
The definition of "solicitation" was found to be workable under
civil law, as well as common law systems. On the other hand, the concept of conspiracy is not generally recognized under the civil law systems, so that inclusion of this term required a common law definition
eVen though the requirement of an "overt act" brings such a definition
close to preparatory acts in civilist-Romanist systems. [See R. Merle
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and A. Vitu, Traite de Droit Criminel (1967).] It is to be noted that
conspiracy and participation in a group action are separate terms with
separate definitions. The concept, however, is found in the Nuremberg
and Tokyo War Crimes trials.
In 9. "attempt" was given a definition based on the Model Penal Code,
but with modifications reflecting the concern of civil law jurists. For
example, the term "preparation" has been omitted and "substantial step"
has been amplified by the addition of the words "unequivocal and
direct." This modification was intended to provide a meaning that would
be recognized under civil law as being as limited as the meaning that
these provisions would be given under common law systems. See
Fletcher, op. cit.
The definitions for the terms "participation in a group action," "solicitation," "conspiracy" and "attempt" are provided in the "General
Part." Such conduct in reference to the proscriptions of the "Special
Part' is included in the "General Part" as opposed to the "Special Part"
as is more consonant with the civil law system. [See generally R. Merle
and A. Vitu, Traite de Droit Criminel (1967); P. Bouzat and J. Pinatel,
Traite de Droit Penale (mise a jour 1975); H.-H. Jescheck, Lehrbuch des
Strafrechts (1975).]
10. and 11. deal with "person in authority" and "omission" and are included for the purpose of criminalizing failure of persons in authority
to fulfill their legal duties arising out of any specific duty referred to
in the "Special Part."
It is clear that the definitions provided reflect a certain conceptual
choice and the attempt to integrate civilist-Romanist and common law
principles and those principles which have emerged from the history
and practice of international criminal law. [In that respect see S. Glaser,
Infractions Internationale (1957) and S. Plawski, Etude des Principes
Fondamentaux du Droit InternationalPenal (1972).]
Article XXI-Responsibility.
The basis of responsibility or accountability follows the "Definitions" and precedes "Elements of an International Crime" because of
the view that the various levels and types of accountability should be
set forth first so as to define to whom and on what basis responsibility
can be imputed. This approach neither fits the common law nor the
civil law models. It was deemed appropriate subject to the special status
of these Tribunals and the historical peculiarities of international criminal law in light of the precedents of the Leipzig War Crimes Trials,
though these were subject to German laws, and the Nuremberg and
Tokyo War Crimes Trials. There is no analogy to be found in the writings of scholars to that approach. This identification of criminally accountable subjects should be read in par! materia with the Provision
on "Definitions."
Under 1 through 5, criminal responsibility is assigned not only to
committing a crime, but also to attempting, soliciting or conspiring to
commit any crime. However, because the element of harm is required
unless that requirement is modified by the definition of the specific
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offense, criminal responsibility for acts not constituting a "commission"
are controlled by the definitions of the crime, which may have a different requirement. Other provisions relating to individual responsibility
are taken from parallel provisions of national penal codes. It was noted
that the provision relating to responsibility for acts of others is not
intended to create a new crime, but rather to express the principle of
derivative responsibility which exists in one way or another in every
penal system. These provisions are more in conformity to the common
law approach than to the continental approach.
The provisions regarding group responsibility were framed to serve
two purposes: to make groups themselves accountable under the Article
dealing with penalties, and to prevent an individual from escaping
responsibility where he provided a group with continued intangible
support despite its foreseeable criminal conduct as reflected in the principles of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Special provision is made for responsibility of persons in authority in order to
incorporate responsibility for failure to act. This provision is based on
military law and command responsibility as it is incorporated in the
Four Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and in particular in the
1977 Additional Protocol Amending the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949 concerning failure of superiors to control acts of subordinates
and other sources of international criminal law.
6. on state responsibility is essentially drawn from the Draft Principles of State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission. [See U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246, 5 March 1971; P. Guggenheim,
Traite de Droit International(1952) and C. Eagleton, The Responsibility
of States in InternationalLaw (1928); Strupp, Handbuch des Volkerrechts
-Das volkerrechtliche Delikt (1920), and more recently F. Munch, Das
volkerrechtliche Delikt (1963) and H.-H. Jescheck, Die Verantwortlichkeit
der Staatsorganen-NachVolkerstrafrecht (1952).]
These provisions are intended to cover both responsibility for failure to act and non-state entities that subsequently become states by
analogy to principles of state succession in international law. [See generally D. P. O'Connell, State Succession in International Law (1967).]
Article XXII-Elements of an International Crime
This provision seeks to synthesize common law and civil law concepts as well as to take into account fundamental principles of international criminal law in providing for and defining the four essential elements of an international crime. There seems to be agreement on the need
for all such elements, even though there are divergences with respect to
the meaning and content of each one. Probably the most authoritative
work on the subject is Stefan Glaser, Infraction Internationale (1957).
In it, Glaser starts, as does this Article, with the material element, but
then interjects certain legal justifications before dealing with the mental element. He concludes his work with participation and complicity.
In this respect, a conceptual difficulty arises and the choice was to
separate the required elements of a crime from the "responsibility," and
conditions of "Exoneration." The approach of dividing "Responsibility,"
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"Element of an International Crime," and "Exoneration" into three different Provisions seeks to avoid doctrinal differences between common
law and civil law by devising a neutral approach.
The material element satisfies both the common law and civil law
systems, as does to a great extent the mental element, though it is
couched in more objective terms.
In recognition of the fact that most civil law criminal codes do not
specify causation as a separate element, the element of causation could
be interpreted as included in the material element of a crime in civil
law systems and separate for common law systems.
It was agreed that the mental element should not extend to mere
negligence, but it was feared that mere exclusion of negligence would
result in responsibility under civil law systems for mental states between
mere negligence and recklessness. Accordingly, the decision was made
to list the mental states of intent, knowledge, and recklessness with the
understanding that recklessness went beyond the dolus eventualis, described under the 1976 German Penal Code as a state of mind such
that the person knew that harm would result.
For common law systems, however, a separate provision on causation was added.
The fourth such element, harm, was recognized as requiring interpretation in connection with the offense in question. It was determined
that provision should be made for circumstances where an offense did
not require an outcome whose character would match the usual meaning
of the word "harm." Similar concern was voiced regarding the element
of causation, so that it was determined to qualify the listing of elements
with a clause providing that these elements may be altered by the definition of a given crime.
Article XXIII-Immunities
This provision is set forth immediately after principles of responsibility and imputability, the elements of a crime, because of the peculiarity
of international law with respect to immunities which derive from the
principles of sovereignty. [See Sutton, "Jurisdiction Over Diplomatic
Personnel and International Organizations' Personnel for Common Crimes
and for Internationally Defined Crimes," in M. C. Bassiouni and V. P.
Nanda, A Treatise in International Criminal Law (1973), Vol. II, p. 97.
See also Oppenheim, International Law (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955), p.
757; Harvard Research on International Law, Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities, 26 A.J.I.L. 15-187 (Supp. 1932); and Immunite, Extraterritorialite et Droit d'Asile en Droit Penal International, 49 Revue Int'le
de Droit Penal, No. 2 (1978).]
This text is based on the provisions of: 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations; 1963 Convention on Consular Relations; 1968
United Nations Draft Convention on Special Missions; 1946 Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies; Draft
Articles on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations, The International Law Commission, 1972; Draft
Articles on the Protection and Inviolability of Diplomatic Agents and
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Other Persons Entitled to Special Protection Under International Law,
The Organization of American States, 1971; Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortions that are of InternationalSignificance (1971),
the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
InternationallyProtectedPersons Including DiplomaticAgents, The General Agreement of Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe
of 1949, the Supplementary Agreement of 18 March 1950, and the four
additional Protocols to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (1952, 1961).
The text also takes into account customary principles of international law on the immunity of Heads of State and the practice of states.
The nature of the immunity provided herein is, however, more narrowly
circumscribed, as it is not absolute. The text obligates the Contracting
Parties whose national is the subject of any immunity category contained herein to take appropriate action against such persons, but permits waiver of that jurisdiction in favor of the International Court much
as do the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on Status of Forces Agreement; [see Coker, "The Status of Visiting Military Forces in Europe,"
in M. C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on International
Criminal Law (1973) Vol. II, p. 115.]
Article XXIV-Penalties
Separate provisions are made for punishment of different types of
offenders, all subject to the requirement in Section 1 that punishment
be proportional to seriousness of the violation and the harm threatened
or caused as well as to the degree of responsibility of the actor.
The Court is directed to develop appropriate Rules before exercising its jurisdiction. It must be noted that principles of legality are not
violated by these provisions because the Court should first promulgate
the penalties and the criteria for their application.
Paragraph 3 recognizes the principle of the Nuremberg Tribunals
that' organizations as such may be punished by means of fines. [See
Dinstein, infra]. This provision goes beyond continental principles.
Paragraph 4, punishment of states by imposition of fines is provided, it being considered beyond the scope of the court's ability to
impose other sanctions. [See Triffterer, "Jurisdiction Over States for
Crimes of State," and Baxter, "Jurisdiction Over War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity: Individual and State Accountability," in M.C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on InternationalCriminal Law
(1973) Vol. II, pp. 86-96 and 65-85. See also Munch, "State Responsibility
in International Law," in Bassiouni and Nanda, supra, Vol. I, pp. 143
et seq.; C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law
(1924); C. de Visscher, La responsabilite des Etats (1924); F. Munch,
Das volkerrechtliche Delikt (1963); J. Castillon, Les Reparations allemandes-Deux experiences (1919-1932, 1945-1952), (1953), and H.-H. Jescheck, Die Vorantwortlichkeit der Staatsorganen-NachVolkersstrafrecht
(1952).]
Paragraph 5 confers discretion on the court whether to impose cumulative sentences for crimes arising from a single transaction.
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Paragraph 6, dealing with mitigation, provides for the possibility that
the fact that an accused was acting under orders could be considered
a mitigating factor. This reflects the content of Article 8 of the London
Charter of 8 August 1945 establishing the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg. [See Y. Dinstein, The Defense of "Obedience to Superior
Orders' in International Law p. 260 at 283 (1965).]
Article XXV-Exoneration
While the Civil Law system would view the conditions of exoneration
listed in this Article as a questionable combination of principles of responsibility and legal defense, it was felt that a single provision containing all conditions which ultimately result in exoneration from responsibility, irrespective of their doctrinal or dogmatic basis should be
placed together, as it gives these aspects a sense of cohesion and practical use by an international tribunal.
The self-defense provision, Paragraph 2, is based on that contained
in Article IIa of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as well as on the language used in
the Model Penal Code. The requirement that the defender reasonably
believe that forceful response is necessary is a common law requirement
which is superfluous for civil law systems. On the other hand, the introduction of the requirement that the response be to an "imminent"
use of unlawful force may be viewed under the common law as surplusage.
The defense of necessity is limited in Paragraph 3 to use of force
not likely to produce death as a policy decision to restrain individuals.
Coercion, under Paragraph 4, was limited as a defense to situations
where the threat or use of force is "imminent."
Paragraph 5 makes obedience to superior orders a defense where
the person accused was not in a position to know of the criminal nature
of his acts. Conversely, Paragraph 6 protects persons from prosecutions
for refusing to follow orders to commit crimes.
Paragraph 7 adopts the formulation of the Model Penal Code relating to mistake of law or fact, conditioning this defense on negation of
criminal intent.
Paragraph 8, on double jeopardy, simply seeks to give effect to the
principle ne bis in idem. The fourth paragraph recognizes the competence of the International Criminal Court to overlook pardons and amnesties of other jurisdictions in order to avoid that state's resort to that
practice from negotiating a person's punishability. It applies to the actual conduct involved rather than to any legal characterization of that
conduct by any State.
Paragraph 9 is based on the Model Penal Code's provision on the defense of insanity. This differs from civilist systems where such a condition is deemed a pre-condition to criminal responsibility.
Paragraph 10 on the defense of intoxication springs from the same
source, and excludes voluntary intoxication as a defense to crimes requiring intent.
The renunciation principles set forth in Section 11 also stem from
the Model Penal Code but are in keeping with the continental approach.
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This provision includes principles of justification, conditions negating criminal responsibility, excusability and procedural defenses.
From a Romanist-Civilist perspective it is doctrinally challengeable on
the very grounds that it encompasses too much diversity. However, its
justification rests on pragmatic reasons which avoid the dogmatism
that has been at the basis of so much debate between European penalists
for so long.
Article XXVI-Statute of Limitation
The approach adopted measures the limitation period by the maximum
potential penalty required for similar offenses under the national law
of the state where the crime was committed as is the case under Penalties. It should be noted that, under this approach, where the maximum
penalty is life imprisonment or death, there is no limitation period.
Also, it was necessary to add Paragraph 1.3 because offenses by states are
punishable only by fines under this Code. This approach was preferred
notwithstanding the Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutes of
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, of 9 Dec.
1968; [see also 39 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal (1968) dedicated
to this topic, and the European Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
of 1974.] In fact, the result of this approach and that of the Conventions
referred to above, is for all practical purposes the same except for minor
offenses and in fact avoids the difficulties which have prevented the
ratification of these treaties by a number of states.

Sixth Part:Duties of States-Parties
Article XXVII-General Principles. The basis of international enforcement and cooperation derives from the maxim aut dedere aut
judicare from Hugo Grotius, De lure Belli ac Pacis (1624). It is now
recognized as a general principle of international law to "prosecute or
extradite"; [see Bassiouni, "International Extradition and World Public
Order," in Aktuelle Probleme des Internationalen Strafrechts (1970) pp.
10, 15 (ed. D. Oehler and P. G. Ptz)] and it is the conceptual basis of
the indirect enforcement scheme, that international criminal law has
relied upon. It is embodied in international criminal law conventions.
The mechanism by which the indirect enforcement scheme operates, is
that a state obligates itself under an international convention to include
appropriate provisions in its national laws which would make the internationally proscribed conduct a national crime. This approach is
found in all international criminal law conventions establishing such a
duty upon its Contracting Parties. [See e.g., the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, in their respective Articles 49-50/50-51/129130/146-147.] It is also the case with respect to all other international
criminal law conventions; see Appendix 2.
Article XXVIII-Surrender of Accused Persons. Surrender of the accused is equivalent to extradition. Because of the importance of extradition in this enforcement scheme, it is covered herein with as much
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detail as possible in light of existing problems perceived in the practice. The "political offense exception" is excluded from all international
crimes herein. [See Article VII of the 1948 Genocide Convention; the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27 Jan. 1977;
the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol Amending the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, Protocol I, Article 78. See also Bassiouni, "Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions under the Draft Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949," 8 RutgersCamden L.J. 185 (1977); D. Poncet and P. Neyroud, L'Extradition et
rAisle Politique en Suisse (1976); C. Van den Wijngaert, The political
offence exception to extradition: The delicate problem of balancing the
rights of the individual and international public order (1980).] The language used in this Article is patterned after the 1970 Hague Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. [See e.g., M. C.
Bassiouni, InternationalExtradition and World Public Order (1974), and
I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (1971). See also the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1979 and the
European Convention on Extradition, 13 December 1957. See also, Legal
Aspects of ExtraditionAmong European States (Council of Europe, 1970).
For different national perspectives, see 38 Revue Int'le de Droit Penal
(1968), and T. Vogler, Auslieferungsrecht und Grundgesetz (1969). For
a historical perspective, see A. Billot, Traite de rExtradition, (1874). See
also, M. Pisani and F. Mosconi, Codice Delle Convenzioni di Estradizione e di Assistenza Giudiziaria in Materia Penale (1979).] In general,
the laws of the requested state are applicable as is the case in all multilateral and bilateral extradition treaties.
Article XXIX-Judicial Assistance and Other Forms of Cooperation.
The requested Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its
law any letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to
it by the judicial authorities of the requesting Party for the purpose of
procuring evidence or transmitting objects, records or documents to
be produced in evidence.
The requested Party shall effect service of writs and records of
judicial decisions which are transmitted to it for this purpose by the
requesting Party. Service may be effected by simple transmission of the
writ or record to the person to be served. Other formalities shall be
established by Rules of the Court. [See the 1959 European Convention
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and in part on the 1972
European Convention on Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters.
See also, Grutzner, "International Judicial Assistance and Cooperation
in Criminal Matters," in M. C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda (eds.), A
Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. 2, pp. 189 and 217-218
(1973). See also, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on
the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (Council of Europe,
1972); Problems Arising from the PracticalApplication of the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Council of Europe 1971); de Schutter, "International Criminal Law in Evolution:
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Benelux Countries,"
14 Neth. Int'l. L. Rev. 382 (1967); Griitzner, International judicial As-
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sistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters, and Markees, "The Difference in Concept Between Civil and Common Law Countries as to
Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters," in M. C.
Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise in InternationalCriminal
Law, Vol. 2, pp. 189 and 171 (1973). See also, H. Griitzner, Internationales Rechtshilfeverkehr (1967). For the text of these and other treaties
see, M. Pisani and F. Mosconi, Codice Delle Convenzioni di Estradizione
e di Assistenza Giudiziaria in Materia Penale (1979).]
Article XXX-Recognition of the Judgments of the InternationalPenal
Tribunal. This article is applicable to: (a) sanctions involving deprivation of liberty; (b) fines or confiscations; (c) disqualifications. A StateParty shall under the conditions provided for in this Convention enforce
a sanction imposed by the Court, and vice versa. [See the 1970 European
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements. See
also Aspects of International Validity of Criminal Judgements (Council
of Europe, 1968) and Explanatory Report on the European Convention
on the InternationalValidity of CriminalJudgements (Council of Europe,
1970). See also Harari, McLean and Silverwood, "Reciprocal Enforcement of Criminal Judgements," 45 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal
585 (1974); D. Oehler, "Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgements and
their Enforcement," in M. C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda (eds.), A
Treatise on InternationalCriminal Law, Vol. II, p. 261 (1973); Schearer,
"Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Judgement," 47 Aust.
L.J. 585 (1973); D. Oehler, Internationalen Strafrecht (1973). For the
Benelux Convention, see Convention Concerning Customs and Excise,
September 5, 1972, Belgium-Luxembourg-The Netherlands, 247 U.N.T.S.
329 (1956). See also K. Kraelle, Le Benelux Commente, Textes Officiels
147, 209, 306 (1961); De Schutter, "International Criminal Cooperation:
The Benelux Example," in M. C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda (eds.), A
Treatise in InternationalCriminal Law, Vol. 2, p. 261 (1973). The Scandinavian countries' arrangement for recognition and enforcement of
penal judgments is reproduced in H. Griitzner Internationales Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsache, pt. IV (1967). The arrangement between France
and certain African states is reproduced in 52 Rev. Critique de Droit
InternationalPrive 863 (1973).]
Article XXXI-Transfer of Offenders and Execution of Sentences.
This Article relies on the concepts embodied in the 1970 European
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements, and
the 1964 European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally
Sentenced or Conditionally Released Offenders. It also relies on the
treaties on the execution of penal sentences between the United States
and Mexico, 5 Nov. 1976, between the United States and Canada, 2
March 1977, and between the United States and Bolivia, 10 Feb.
1978, all treaties having entered into force. Furthermore, special reliance was placed on U.S. legislation implementing the above treaties,
18 U.S.C., Sections 4100-4115. [See Bassiouni, "Perspectives on the Transfer of Prisoners Between the United States and Mexico and the United
States and Canada," 11 Vanderbilt J. TransnationalL. 249 (1978); Bassiouni, "A Practitioner's Perspective on Prisoner Transfer," 4 Nat'l j.
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Crim. Defense 127 (1978); Abramovsky and Eagle, "A Critical Evaluation of the Newly-Ratified Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty," 64 Iowa L. Rev. 325 (1979) and Professor Vagt's response
thereto in the same issue.]
A scheme for transfer of offenders can be said to rely in part on
the assumption that a given state will recognize the criminal judgment
of another and of the Court. The manner in which this Article is drafted
makes that assumption. [See in particular Article 6 of the 1970 European
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements.]
Seventh Part: Treaty Provisions
The treaty provisions are somewhat standard, except for the reservations clause which though in keeping with the Vienna Convention on
treaty interpretation also takes into account the relevant aspects of the
Advisory Opinion By The InternationalCourt of Justice On Reservations
To The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of Genocide,
1951 I.C.J. 15.
One of the conditions for this Convention's implementation is, of
course, the need for the Standing Committee to be created and to start
functioning and that is why a special provision has been made to that
effect.

CONCLUSION

To some this effort will seem utopian, but to us and many others
it is another link in the arduous progress of the humanitarian development of the Rule of Law. It is more eloquently said in the words of

George Bernard Shaw: "Some men see things as they are and ask why.
I dream things that never were, and ask why not?"

